GOGITIDZE AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA JUDGMENT 33 should be examined under the “civil” head of that provision (see, amongst many other authorities, Arcuri and Others, cited above; Butler, cited above; Veits, cited above, § 58; and Silickienė cited above, §§ 45 and 56; contrast with, for instance, Phillips, cited above, § 39). 122. As regards the first and fourth applicants’ complaint that the judicial proceedings at first instance had been conducted in their absence, the Court reiterates its previous finding that the applicants themselves chose to waive their procedural right to take part in the proceedings (see paragraph 110 above). As to the applicants’ argument that they should not have been made to bear the burden of proving the lawfulness of the origins of their property, the Court reiterates there can be nothing arbitrary, for the purposes of the “civil” limb of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in the reversal of the burden of proof onto the respondents in the forfeiture proceedings in rem after the public prosecutor had submitted a substantiated claim (see, among other authorities, Grayson and Barnham, cited above, §§ 37-49, as well as the Court’s findings at paragraphs 103 and 104 above). As to the calling into question by the applicants of the domestic courts’ findings of fact, the Court reiterates that it cannot act as a fourth instance and will not therefore question those domestic findings (see, for instance, Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, 5 February 2015). 123. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. (b) The first applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention 124. The Court reiterates that the question of the applicability of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention is normally to be examined under two aspects: a narrow aspect relating to the conduct of the relevant criminal trial as such, and a more extensive one which can go beyond the scope of the trial under certain conditions (see, for instance, Vanjak v. Croatia, no. 29889/04, § 67, 14 January 2010). 125. In this connection the Court observes that the forfeiture proceedings in rem in the present case did not take place after the criminal prosecution of the first applicant, but on the contrary preceded it. Consequently, the second, more extensive, aspect of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the role of which is to prevent the principle of presumption of innocence from being undermined after the relevant criminal proceedings have ended with an outcome other than conviction (such as acquittal, discontinuation of the criminal proceedings as being statute-barred, the death of an accused, and so on), is of no relevance in the present case (see Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25424/09, §§ 103 and 104, ECHR 2013; Geerings v. the Netherlands, no. 30810/03, §§ 43-50, 1 March 2007; Phillips, cited above, § 35; and Lagardère v. France, no. 18851/07, §§ 58-64, 12 April 2012).