judicial police and have expressed concern at the fact that the military carry out the tasks of investigation, arrest, detention and interrogation, 117 and have stated that “[t]he functions of the judicial police should be carried out exclusively by a civilian entity.” […] This would ensure the independence of investigations and would greatly improve access to justice for victims and witnesses of human rights violations, whose complaints currently tend to be investigated by the very institutions they accuse of perpetrating those violations.” 118 87. Moreover, this Court has held that "even though […] the State has the right and obligation to guarantee its security and maintain public order, its power is not unlimited, since it has the duty, at all times, to apply procedures according to Law and respectful of the fundamental rights of all individuals under its jurisdiction.” 119 In that respect, the Court has emphasized the extreme care which States must exercise when they decide to use their Armed Forces as a means of controlling social protests, domestic disturbances, internal violence, public emergencies and common crime. 120 88. As this Court has held, States must restrict to the greatest extent the use of Armed Forces to control domestic crime or internal violence, since they are trained to defeat a legitimate target and not to protect and control civilians, a training that corresponds to police forces. 121 The strict fulfillment of the duty to prevent and protect endangered rights must be assumed by the domestic authorities, observing a clear demarcation between military and police duties. 122 89. The Court considers that the possibility of assigning the Armed Forces tasks aimed at restricting the personal liberty of civilians, in addition to meeting the requirements of strict proportionality in the restriction of a right, must respond, in turn, to strict exceptional criteria and due diligence in the protection of treaty guarantees, bearing in mind, as indicated (supra paras. 86 and 87), that the system of the armed forces, from which it is difficult for members to remove themselves, is not compatible with the functions of civilian authorities. 3. Failure to promptly bring the matter before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power 90. The Commission indicated that “once arrest[ed], the [alleged] victims should have been brought, without delay, before the Public Prosecutor’s Office so that it could hand them over to a judge,” which “did not happen until at least four days after their arrest.” It added that “from the records and arguments provided by 117 See United Nations. Final Observations of the Committee on Human Rights. Colombia 05/05/97. CCPR/C/79/Add.76, para. 19. 118 Cf. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Extra-Judicial Executions E/CN.4/1995/111, para. 117.a). Ratified by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.2), para. 185. 119 Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 174; Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C N° 99, para. 111; and Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, para. 86. 120 Cf. Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 5, 2006. Series C Nº. 150, para. 78; Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 51; Case of Perozo et al. V. Venezuela, supra note 24, para. 166. 121 Cf. Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, supra note 120, para. 78; and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 51. 122 Cf. Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 24, para. 51. 33