McCANN AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES RYSSDAL, BERNHARDT, THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON, GÖLCÜKLÜ, PALM, PEKKANEN, SIR JOHN FREELAND, BAKA AND JAMBREK 63 being fired; and had it not been for Savage’s actions as Soldiers C and D closed on him, which may have been prompted by the sound of gunfire from the McCann and Farrell incident, there is every possibility that he, too, would have been seized and arrested without resort to shooting. 20. The implication at the end of paragraph 211 that the authorities did not exercise sufficient care in evaluating the information at their disposal before transmitting it to soldiers "whose use of firearms automatically involved shooting to kill" appears to be based on no more than "the failure to make provision for a margin of error" to which the beginning of the paragraph refers. We have dealt already with the "insufficient allowances for alternative possibilities" point (see, again, paragraphs 13-16 above), which we take to be the same as the alleged failure to provide for a margin of error which is referred to here. Any assessment of the evaluation by the authorities of the information at their disposal should, in any event, take due account of their need to reckon throughout with the incompleteness of that information (see paragraph 8 above); and there are no cogent grounds for any suggestion that there was information which they ought reasonably to have known but did not. 21. Paragraph 212, after making a glancing reference to the restrictive effect of the public interest certificates and saying that it is not clear "whether the use of firearms to wound their targets may have been warranted by the specific circumstances that confronted them at the moment of arrest", goes on to say that "their reflex action in this vital respect lacks the degree of caution ... to be expected from law-enforcement personnel in a democratic society, even when dealing with dangerous terrorist suspects, and stands in marked contrast to the standard of care reflected in the instructions in the use of firearms by the police". It concludes with the assertion that this "failure by the authorities also suggests a lack of appropriate care in the control and organisation of the arrest operation". 22. As regards any suggestion that, if an assessment on the issue had been required by their training or instruction to be carried out by the soldiers, shooting to wound might have been considered by them to have been warranted by the circumstances at the time, it must be recalled that those circumstances included a genuine belief on their part that the suspects might be about to detonate a bomb by pressing a button. In that situation, to shoot merely to wound would have been a highly dangerous course: wounding alone might well not have immobilised a suspect and might have left him or her capable of pressing a button if determined to do so. 23. More generally as regards the training given, there was in fact ample evidence at the inquest to the effect that soldiers (and not only these soldiers) would be trained to respond to a threat such as that which was thought to be posed by the suspects in this case - all of them dangerous terrorists who were believed to be putting many lives at immediate risk - by