identified two remedies: “[n]on-applicability based on non-constitutionality established in article 93(6) of the Constitution” and “the action on unconstitutionality.” Regarding the former, they considered that, “[i]n Chile it is unthinkable that a domestic court may agree to hear a claim against an element (in this case a reparation amount) previously established by the legislator. Indeed the faculties given to the Constitutional Court over the law are fairly limited.” Regarding the latter, they stated that “neither would this be applicable because it depends on the existence of a prior declaration of the inapplicability of a legal principle […] according to the above-mentioned article 93(6).” The representatives considered that “it should be concluded that there are no other judicial or administrative remedies to claim the pension or the “bonus payment,” depending on the case, granted by Law 19,992.” 172. In addition, with regard to the pension based on the status of “a person dismissed for political reasons,” they maintained that it had been granted with an “unjustified delay,” because Mr. García Lucero has been receiving it since 2000, “[seven] years after he had requested the protection of [his rights]. They also indicated that Mr. García Lucero “has received this pension retroactively since September 1998.” 173. The State affirmed that: Nowadays it is evident and not even a subject for discussion that States are obliged to provide reparation to the victims of human rights violations. This obligation is a principle of public international law and a norm included in the system of universal and regional conventions. 172 174. Regarding the reparations provided to Mr. García Lucero, the State indicated that, since the facts occurred during the military regime that governed the country from 1973 to 1990, certain particularities must be taken into account. Thus, the reparation criteria “have had to be redefined” in the “processes of the transition to democracy during which it has been necessary to deal with massive and systematic human rights violations.” In order to “assume the burden of a process of transition to democracy,” the implementation of a “program of reparations” by the State appeared to be an effective way of coordinating all the State’s efforts.” It indicated that “the programs comply with the requirement of comprehensiveness, because the measures established […] include […] material, moral and social aspects intrinsic to a process of reparation for human rights violations.” It also asserted, reflecting the considerations of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, in a report on a visit to Chile in August 2012, that: In collective reparation programs, where it may not be possible to assess the damage suffered by each individual victim and where total reparation of the harm caused is also impossible, even the most generous program will be insufficient if what is expected is reparation of all the harm. Nevertheless, specific solutions may be provided to some of the problems arising from the harm suffered. 175. The State emphasized that, different actions were being taken in Chile that the Court had assessed positively in its judgment in the case of Almonacid Arellano et al. 173 It argued that “[t]he system of reparations implemented in Chile is adapted to the relevant international standards,” and “covers various aspects, particularly: health, social welfare, education, housing, preservation of memory, truth and justice” and asserted that this system includes “two dimensions of reparations.” The first “relates to a collective dimension under which, in addition to other benefits, reparations of a financial type have been 172 The State referred to “[t]he right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms,” Final report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, submitted in accordance with resolution 1999/33 of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights of 18 January 2000 [E/CN.4/2000/62]. 173 Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, supra, para. 161. 53