137. Furthermore, in the Applicant State’s opinion, the Respondent State’s assertion that the alleged violation of human rights must have been committed on the territory of the Respondent State for the Court to have territorial jurisdiction implies that if a State Party to the Charter, to the Protocol and to other human rights instruments committed such violations on the territory of another State Party, it would not be held responsible before the Court. 138. The Applicant State asserts that in the instant case, the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction does not arise since the question for determination is not that of the jurisdiction of the national courts of a State beyond its borders but rather that of the Court, which is a human rights protection body in Africa. According to the Applicant State, “the issue at stake is not either that of the application of the Charter by the Court given that the latter is not called to apply the said instrument on the territory of a random State”. 139. The Applicant State argues that, in the instant case, it is praying the Court to apply the Charter to alleged human rights violations committed by the Respondent State on the territory of a State Party to this human rights instrument. 140. The Applicant State further avers that the Court can only apply extraterritorial jurisdiction if the alleged violations of human rights took place on the territory of a State which is not a party to the Protocol or the Charter. However, in such a situation, other conditions would have to be met, particularly, the acceptance by the State concerned of the Court’s jurisdiction, which is not the case here. 141. At the hearing, the Applicant State reiterated the content of its submissions. It maintained, moreover, that no interpretation of Article 3 of the Protocol could reasonably limit the Court's territorial jurisdiction solely to alleged violations that took place on the territory of the Respondent State. It points 34