20 ALTUĞ TANER AKÇAM v. TURKEY JUDGMENT Dink, for their unfavourable opinions on sensitive issues (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above). Thus, abusive or arbitrary applications of this provision by the judiciary compelled the Government to revise it with a view to bringing it into line with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention as interpreted by the Court. 90. To that end, three major changes were introduced to the text of Article 301. Firstly, the terms “Turkishness” and “Republic” were replaced by “Turkish Nation” and “State of the Republic of Turkey”. Secondly, the maximum length of imprisonment imposable on those found guilty was reduced and considerations of aggravating circumstances were excluded. Thirdly and lastly, an additional security clause was added to the text, which now provides that any investigation into an offence defined under that provision shall be subject to the permission of the Minister of Justice (see paragraphs 43 and 44 above). It is clear from this last amendment that the legislator’s aim was to prevent arbitrary prosecutions under this provision. 91. Be that as it may, the Court must ascertain whether the revised version is sufficiently clear to enable a person to regulate his/her conduct and to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Grigoriades, cited above, § 37). 92. In this connection, the Court notes that despite the replacement of the term “Turkishness” by “the Turkish Nation”, there seems to be no change or major difference in the interpretation of these concepts because they have been understood in the same manner by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 45 above). Accordingly, the legislator’s amendment of the wording in the provision in order to clarify the meaning of the term “Turkishness” does not introduce a substantial change or contribute to the widening of the protection of the right to freedom of expression. 93. In the Court’s opinion, while the legislator’s aim of protecting and preserving values and State institutions from public denigration can be accepted to a certain extent, the scope of the terms under Article 301 of the Criminal Code, as interpreted by the judiciary, is too wide and vague and thus the provision constitutes a continuing threat to the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. In other words, the wording of the provision does not enable individuals to regulate their conduct or to foresee the consequences of their acts. As is clear from the number of investigations and prosecutions brought under this provision (see paragraphs 28-33 and 47 above), any opinion or idea that is regarded as offensive, shocking or disturbing can easily be the subject of a criminal investigation by public prosecutors. 94. As noted above, the safeguards put in place by the legislator to prevent the abusive application of Article 301 by the judiciary do not provide a reliable and continuous guarantee or remove the risk of being directly affected by the provision because any political change in time might