A/HRC/22/44 51. Consequently, the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty is part of treaty law, customary international law and constitutes a jus cogens norm. Its specific content, as laid out in this deliberation, remains fully applicable in all situations. C. Qualification of particular situations as deprivation of liberty 52. In 1964, a committee established by the former Commission on Human Rights studied the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile. To date, this study remains the one and only detailed multilateral study on the issue. According to this study, detention is: the act of confining a person to a certain place, whether or not in continuation of arrest, and under restraints which prevent him from living with his family or carrying out his normal occupational or social activities.19 53. The study defined arrest as: the act of taking a person into custody under the authority of the law or by compulsion of another kind and includes the period from the moment he is placed under restraint up to the time he is brought before an authority competent to order his continued custody or to release him.20 54. When the Working Group was established, the term “detention” was not expressively defined. It was only with the adoption of resolution 1997/50 of the former Commission on Human Rights that the differing interpretations of the term were provisionally resolved. The resolution provides for the renewal of the mandate of the Working Group: entrusted with the task of investigating cases of deprivation of liberty imposed arbitrarily, provided that no final decision has been taken in such cases by domestic courts in conformity with domestic law, with the relevant international standards set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the relevant international instruments accepted by the States concerned. 55. The Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 8 (1982) on the right to liberty and security of persons concluded that article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant is applicable to “all deprivations of liberty” including cases concerning immigration control.21 Any confinement or retention of an individual accompanied by restriction on his or her freedom movement, even if of relatively short duration, may amount to de facto deprivation of liberty. 56. The Working Group has consistently followed the position that “what mattered to the [former Commission on Human Rights] in the expression ‘arbitrary detention’ was essentially the word ‘arbitrary’, i.e., the elimination, in all its forms, of arbitrariness, whatever might be the phase of deprivation of liberty concerned”.22 19 20 21 22 20 necessity is inherent in the plea: any conduct going beyond what is strictly necessary for the purpose will not be covered”. Department of Economics and Social Affairs, Study of the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile (United Nations publication, Sales No. 65.XIV.2), para. 21. Ibid., para. 21. Human Rights Committee, Torres v. Finland, communication No. 291/1988, Views adopted on 2 April 1990; A. v. Australia, communication No. 560/1993, Views adopted on 3 April 1997. Report of the Working Group to the Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/1997/4, para. 54. GE.12-18935