counsel for failing to call character witnesses who would have refuted the prosecution’s claim that she was a cruel woman. * 119. The Respondent State submits that the Applicant was effectively represented throughout her trial and even during her appeal. It also submits that the Applicant’s claim that her trial was “undermined” by ineffective counsel “is baseless since it is not proven that she really intended to call any witness.” The Respondent State further submits that if the Applicant’s counsel was indeed ineffective, she had the avenue of “recusing the counsel before the trial Judge, of which she did not avail herself.” Citing Onyango Nganyi v. Tanzania, the Respondent State submits that “a State cannot be held liable for every misconduct on the part of the counsel appointed for legal aid.” *** 120. The Court observes that Article 7(1)(c) of the Charter provides that, “[e]very individual shall have the right to have [their] cause heard. This comprises…the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of [their] choice.” 121. The Court recalls that it has held that Article 7(1)(c) of the Charter, as read together with Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, guarantees for anyone charged with a serious criminal offence, the right to be automatically assigned counsel free of charge whenever the interests of justice so require.39 122. The Court further recalls that it has previously considered the issue of effective representation in the matter of Evodius Rutechura v. Tanzania, where it held that the right to free legal assistance comprises the right to be defended by counsel. However, the right to be defended by counsel of one’s choice is not absolute when the choice is made through a free legal 39 Alex Thomas v. Tanzania (merits), § 124. 35