Applicant’s alleged right to defend himself and have the benefit of a Counsel at the time of his arrest; to free legal assistance during the judicial proceedings; be promptly given the documents in the records to enable him defend himself; not to be convicted solely on the basis of the inconsistent testimony of a single witness in the absence of any identification parade, etc”. In sum, the Court admits that Mr. Abubakari did not have a fair trial. 5. The Court ordered the Respondent State to "take all the necessary measures, within reasonable time, to remedy the violations established." However, in paragraph 234 of its judgment, the Court held that the release of the Applicant could be ordered... only in special and compelling circumstances." The Court further finds that the Applicant has not indicated such exceptional and compelling circumstances. | do not share this opinion. 6. I wish to first emphasize pronounced “only in special and jurisprudence of international an order for release was indeed that I accept that the order for release can be compelling circumstances”. This is an established human rights courts. It happened, however, that ordered’. 7. In the instant case, despite the fact that the Applicant did not invoke special facts to justify exceptional circumstances, I reiterate my firm belief that the Court has itself established the said exceptional and/or compelling circumstances when it upheld all the irregularities that marred the various stages of the case, from arrest to the stage of heavy sentence of 30 years imprisonment. 8. I do not see any "circumstance" more "exceptional and/or compelling" than the one in which the Applicant found and still finds himself, having been languishing in prison for 18 years out of the 30 years inflicted on him following a trial that the Court declared unfair and at variance with certain provisions of the Charter. 9. Unfortunately, by refusing to order the release of the Applicant, the Court did not take its reasoning to its logical conclusion. Yet, it is the only "reparatory" measure that the Court could have ordered, given the circumstances of the case. Indeed, rather than leave to the Respondent the discretion to take appropriate measures, the Court should have ordered the release of the Applicant. 4 Cf. ECHR, Grand Chamber, the case of Del Rio Prada v. Spain, Application No. 42750/09, Judgment of 21 October 2013. “3. Rules by sixteen votes against one, that it is incumbent on the respondent State to ensure the release of the applicant as soon as possible”. Available: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["Arret Del RioPrada"],"languageisocode":["FRE"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"i temid":["001-127680"]}