justified to argue that all the remedies or some of them have not been exhausted, whereas the Applicant submitted the issue of his right to a fair trial before the said national courts —a right that these courts are supposed to guarantee proprio motu in all its aspects, without the Applicant having to specify the particular aspects. 77. \tis therefore clear that the Applicant has exhausted all the ordinary remedies which he was supposed to exhaust. For this reason, the Court dismisses the objection of inadmissibility of the application on grounds of failure to exhaust local remedies. D) Objection based on non-compliance with a reasonable time in filing the application before the Court 78. In its Response, the Respondent submits that, if the Court finds that the Applicant has exhausted local remedies, the latter has however failed to submit his Application before this Court within a reasonable time from when the local remedies were exhausted. 79. \t further argued that even if Rule 40 (6) of the Rules of Court is not specific on the question of reasonable time, international human rights jurisprudence has established that six months is considered a reasonable time. 80. The Respondent points out that the decision of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania dates back to 5 October 2004, but concedes that Tanzania deposited its instrument of ratification only on 10 February 2006; it therefore maintains that the time elapsing since that date up to the referral of the matter to the Court on 8 October 2013 is seven years and nine months, and that this period is far higher than the six months considered to be reasonable. 81. The Respondent State further submitted that the fact that the Applicant was in prison did not and still does not prevent him from accessing the African Court, as he has done elsewhere in this procedure. 3 25 ® » Pw & fc poe ol