violation but failed to take action.3 They add that the Commission has noted that international attention around an alleged violation places the State on notice and provides more than sufficient opportunity to rectify the situation.4 42. The Complainants further allege that Egypt’s national laws do not provide sufficient remedy for torture. Article 126 of the Penal Code of Egypt limits the definition of ‘torture of an accused person with a view to inducing him to make a confession.’ They submit that the definition excludes victims who are not formally accused or charged, similar to the case of the Victim. They add that Egyptian law limits the definition of torture to physical abuse, excluding mental or psychological abuse. 43. The Complainants contend that to require the Victim to take further steps to exhaust domestic remedies would be counter to the principles of justice given that his attempts to exhaust domestic remedies and to obtain his freedom have already been unduly prolonged. 44. The Complainants assert that in Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria, the Commission observed that ‘[e]ven if the situation has improved, such as leading to the release of the detainees, repealing of the offensive laws and tackling of impunity, the position remains that the responsibility of the present government…would still be engaged for acts of human rights violations which were perpetrated by its predecessors.’5 45. The Complainants aver that in Organisation mondiale contre la torture et al. v Rwanda, the Commission stated that even where a situation has ‘undergone dramatic change in the years since the communications were introduced….the Commission has to rule on the facts which were submitted to it.’6 46. The Complainants further submit that in Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (I),7 complainants who challenged their illegal detention and torture were released some months after the Commission seized the case. Although Sudan argued that the release of the Victims represented the closure of the matter, the Commission found the case admissible, noting that ‘[t]he fact that the victims were released does not amount to compensation for violation.’8 47. The Complainants refer to Achutan and another v Malawi, in which the Commission stated ‘that a new government inherits the previous government’s international obligations, including the responsibility for the previous government’s mismanagement.’9 Communications 147/95 and 149/96 – Dawda Jawara v The Gambia (2000) para 31. Communication 155/96 – Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and Another (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) ACHPR para 38. 5 Communication 218/98 – Civil Liberties Organisation and Others v Nigeria (2001) ACHPR para 23. 6 Communications 27/89, 46/91, 49/91 and 99/93 – Organisation mondiale contre la torture et al v Rwanda (1996) ACHPR. 7 Communications 222/98 and 229/99 - Law Office of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan (2003) ACHPR. 8 Id, para 39. 9 Communications 64/92, 68/92 and 78/92 – Krischna Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda), Amnesty International (on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa) v Malawi ACHPR (1994) ACHPR. 3 4 6