". . . Article 7 includes the right to the execution of judgment. It would therefore be inconceivable for this article to grant the right for an individual to bring an appeal before all the national courts in relation to any act violating the fundamental rights without guaranteeing the execution of judicial rulings... as a result, the execution of a final judgment passed by a tribunal or legal court should be considered as an integral part of the right to be heard which is protected in Article 7. The African Commission remains conscious of the fact that without a system of effective execution, other forms of private justice can spring up and have negative consequences on the confidence and credibility of the public in the justice system." Article 26 of the Charter provides as follows: - "States Parties to the present Charter shall have the duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and shall allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present Charter." In Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) Zimbabwe 294/04, the African Commission held that Zimbabwe had violated Article 26 and stated in paragraphs 118 to 120 as follows: "It is impossible to ensure the rule of law, upon which human rights depend, without guaranteeing that courts and tribunals resolve disputes both of a criminal and civil character free of any form of pressure or interference. The alternative to the rule of law is the rule of power, which is typically arbitrary, self-interested and subject to influences which may have nothing to do with the applicable law or the factual merits of the dispute. Without the rule of law and the assurance that comes from an independent judiciary, it is obvious that equality before the law will not exist. It is a vital requirement in a state governed by law that court decisions be respected by the State, as well as individuals. The courts need the trust of the people in order to maintain their authority and legitimacy. The credibility of the courts must not be weakened by the perception that courts can be influenced by any external pressure. Thus, by refusing to comply with the High Court orders, staying the deportation of Mr. Meldrum and requiring the Respondent State to produce him before the Court, the Respondent State undermined the independence of the Courts. This was a violation of Article 26of the African Charter (the emphasis is ours). Finally, reference may be made to a decision of one of the Courts in the SADC region, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which has underlined the importance of States complying with Court orders. In Nyathi v MEC for Department of Health, Gauteng and Another Case CCT 19/07 (2008) ZACC 8 the Constitutional Court stated at paragraph 80 as follows "...In a state predicated on a desire to maintain the rule of law, it is imperative that one and all should be driven by a moral obligation to ensure the continued survival of our democracy. That... means at the very least that there should be strict compliance with court orders." We hold, therefore, in the light of the authorities quoted above, that the Respondent is in breach of Articles 4 (c) and 6 (1) of the Treaty in that it has acted in contravention of various fundamental human rights, namely the right to an effective remedy, the right to have access to an independent and impartial Court or tribunal and the right to a fair hearing. We now turn to examine the effect of section 5 (2) of the State Liability Act (Chapter 8:14) of the Respondent which has already been reproduced. Section 5(2) is similar to section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957 of South Africa which was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in Nyathi, already cited above. The Court held that section 3 placed the State above the law since it did not oblige the State to comply with Court orders. The Court stated, inter alia, that section 3 infringed (a) the right to equality since it disallows a judgment creditor who obtains judgment against the State the same protection and benefit that a judgment creditor who obtains judgment against a private litigant enjoys; 6