O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT – DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI 27 to confess through ‘sympathy falsely aroused’ ... or other like inducement far short of ‘compulsion by torture’, ... it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the States to resort to imprisonment, as here, to compel him to answer questions that might incriminate him. The Fourteenth Amendment secures against State invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement – the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence.”1 Our Court has also contributed to development of the doctrine of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. A recapitulation of the Court’s case-law concerning this issue can be found in Weh v. Austria (no. 38544/97, 8 April 2004). In that judgment the Court reiterates that, although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, the right to silence and the right not to incriminate oneself are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6 (see John Murray v. the United Kingdom, 8 February 1996, § 45, Reports 1996-I). The right not to incriminate oneself in particular presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense the right in question is closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention (see Saunders, cited above, § 68; Serves v. France, 20 October 1997, § 46, Reports 1997-VI; Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, no. 34720/97, § 40, ECHR 2000-XII; and J.B. v. Switzerland, no. 31827/96, § 64, ECHR 2001-III). The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent (see Saunders, cited above, § 69, and Heaney and McGuinness, cited above, § 40). A perusal of the Court’s case-law shows that there are two types of cases in which it has found violations of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. Firstly, there are cases relating to the use of compulsion for the purpose of obtaining information which might incriminate the person concerned in pending or anticipated criminal proceedings against him, in other words, in respect of an offence with which that person has been “charged” within the autonomous meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see Funke v. France, 25 February 1993, § 44, Series A no. 256-A; Heaney and McGuinness, cited above, §§ 55-59; and J.B. v. Switzerland, cited above, §§ 66-71). 1. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964), http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgibin/getcase.pl?friend=nytimes&navby=case&court=us&vol=378&invol=1.