treatment, it does not necessarily mean identical treatment, and where there is differential treatment, there should be a connection between the basis of the treatment and the objective of the relevant legislation that imposes the treatment. The State will consequently not violate the equality clause if there is reasonable justification or compelling reasons why the same class of people were not treated alike. 150. The Commission bears in mind that, in Antoine Bissangou v. Republic of Cong029, it had reckoned that for Article 3 to be applicable, the inequality alleged by the Complainant should follow from the "law". The Commission was also of the opinion that the States would violate Article 3 if they were to exercise a power or judgment conferred by a law in a discriminatory manner. The Commission also had held in that case" that Article 2 contained the 'principle of n011-discrimination' and Article 3, the principle 'of equality', and thus that together these principles 'mean that citizens should be treated in a fair and equitable manner before the law and have the right to enjoy, with no distinction whatsoe"0~F' the 'l;ights, guaranteed by the Charter. It was also of the view that Article 2 is not a standalone right, similar to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and held that it 'does not stipulate a general banning of discrimination but that it only prohibits discrimination where it affects the enjoyment of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter'. In that case, the Commission did not find a violation of Article 2 as it held that the complainants had not shownhow the appfication of other rights in the African Charter had been 'hindered in a discriminatory manner',31 151. In the present case, the Commission notes that although the Constitution of the Respondent State which constitutes the most unambiguous form of law, promotes equal protection of the law and prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin, colour, sex, language, religious creed, political opinion, birth, locality or social status, the actions of the agents of the Respondent State did not reflect nondiscriminatory equal protection before the law. 152. The Commission recalls that in the SERAC case'? it had affirmed that: "Governments have a duty to protect their citizens, not only through appropriate legislation and effective enforcement but also by protecting them from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties. ", In Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Esmaila Connateh & 13 others) v Angolat«, the Commission dealt with complaints alleging similar violations of freedom from discrimination. The victims who had been living in the concerned State for varying lengths of time, were arrested, detained and expelled and their property confiscated notwithstanding that they had obtained official documentation, including visas, residence and work permits, in order to lawfully reside and work in that country. The Commission held that "Article 2 of the African Charter basically forms the anti-discrimination principle that is essential to the spirit of the African Charter and is therefore necessary in eradicating discrimination in all its guises". It further held that "a 27