proceedings, the Applicant did not raise any concern to request communication with the sending State. 172. The Respondent State avers that there was no violation of the VCCR since the law does not provide a mandatory requirement for the government of Tanzania to inform the Applicant’s State but the same would have been done if the Applicant had made such a request. According to the Respondent State, establishing such contact without the Applicant’s request would have been against the principle of non-refoulement. 173. In his Reply, the Applicant submits that Section 25 of the 1998 Refugee Act invoked by the Respondent State cannot restrict the right to consular assistance provided under Article 36 of the VCCR. It is the Applicant’s contention that Article 36 of the VCCR imposes unfettered obligation on State to inform foreign detained individuals without delay of their right to notify the sending State of their arrest. He finally avers that, contrary to the Respondent State submission, facilitating contact between a refugee and the consulate of his state of origin is not equivalent to expulsion that would be against the principle of non-refoulement. *** 174. This Court has previously held that the rights accruing from the provision of Article 36(1) of the VCCR are also protected under Article 7(1)(c) of the Charter.79 As the Court stated in Niyonzima Augustine v. United Republic of Tanzania “consular services are critical to the respect for the right to a fair trial of foreign detained nationals. Article 36(1) of the VCCR, explicitly requires State Parties to facilitate consular services to foreign nationals detained within their jurisdiction”.80 79 80 Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations), supra, §§ 95-96. Augustine v. Tanzania (judgment), supra, § 81. 49