PULP MILLS (JUDGMENT) 104 Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 152 ; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 198, paras. 152-153 ; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), p. 233, para. 460 ; see also Articles 34 to 37 of the International Law Commission Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts). 274. Like other forms of reparation, restitution must be appropriate to the injury suffered, taking into account the nature of the wrongful act having caused it. As the Court has made clear, “[w]hat constitutes ‘reparation in an adequate form’ clearly varies depending upon the concrete circumstances surrounding each case and the precise nature and scope of the injury, since the question has to be examined from the viewpoint of what is the ‘reparation in an adequate form’ that corresponds to the injury” (Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 59, para. 119). 275. As the Court has pointed out (see paragraphs 154 to 157 above), the procedural obligations under the 1975 Statute did not entail any ensuing prohibition on Uruguay’s building of the Orion (Botnia) mill, failing consent by Argentina, after the expiration of the period for negotiation. The Court has however observed that construction of that mill began before negotiations had come to an end, in breach of the procedural obligations laid down in the 1975 Statute. Further, as the Court has found, on the evidence submitted to it, the operation of the Orion (Botnia) mill has not resulted in the breach of substantive obligations laid down in the 1975 Statute (paragraphs 180, 189 and 265 above). As Uruguay was not barred from proceeding with the construction and operation of the Orion (Botnia) mill after the expiration of the period for negotiation and as it breached no substantive obligation under the 1975 Statute, ordering the dismantling of the mill would not, in the view of the Court, constitute an appropriate remedy for the breach of procedural obligations. 276. As Uruguay has not breached substantive obligations arising under the 1975 Statute, the Court is likewise unable, for the same reasons, to uphold Argentina’s claim in respect of compensation for alleged injuries suffered in various economic sectors, specifically tourism and agriculture. 277. Argentina further requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Uruguay must “provide adequate guarantees that it will refrain in future from preventing the Statute of the River Uruguay of 1975 from being applied, in particular the consultation procedure established by Chapter II of that Treaty”. 94