PULP MILLS (JUDGMENT) 53 “a joint mechanism with regulatory, executive, administrative, technical and conciliatory functions, entrusted with the proper implementation of the rules contained in the 1975 Statute governing the management of the shared river resource ; . . . [a] mechanism [which] constitutes a very important part of that treaty régime” (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, I.C.J. Reports 2006, pp. 133-134, para. 81). 87. The Court notes, first, that CARU, in accordance with Article 50 of the 1975 Statute, was endowed with legal personality “in order to perform its functions” and that the parties to the 1975 Statute undertook to provide it with “the necessary resources and all the information and facilities essential to its operations”. Consequently, far from being merely a transmission mechanism between the parties, CARU has a permanent existence of its own ; it exercises rights and also bears duties in carrying out the functions attributed to it by the 1975 Statute. 88. While the decisions of the Commission must be adopted by common accord between the riparian States (Article 55), these are prepared and implemented by a secretariat whose staff enjoy privileges and immunities. Moreover, CARU is able to decentralize its various functions by setting up whatever subsidiary bodies it deems necessary (Article 52). 89. The Court observes that, like any international organization with legal personality, CARU is entitled to exercise the powers assigned to it by the 1975 Statute and which are necessary to achieve the object and purpose of the latter, namely, “the optimum and rational utilization of the River Uruguay” (Article 1). As the Court has pointed out, “[i]nternational organizations are governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that is to say, they are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them” (Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 78, para. 25). This also applies of course to organizations, which like CARU, only have two member States. 90. Since CARU serves as a framework for consultation between the parties, particularly in the case of the planned works contemplated in Article 7, first paragraph, of the 1975 Statute, neither of them may depart from that framework unilaterally, as they see fit, and put other channels of communication in its place. By creating CARU and investing it with all the resources necessary for its operation, the parties have sought to provide the best possible guarantees of stability, continuity and effective43