31 MARCKX v. BELGIUM JUDGMENT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE O'DONOGHUE PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE O’DONOGHUE A number of questions have been formulated for answer by the Court. As I see it, the kernel of the complaint by mother and daughter turns on whether there has been a failure to respect their private and family lives. I accept the position that Paula and Alexandra are entitled to enjoy a private and family life notwithstanding that such life does not spring from a marriage and the foundation of a family as contemplated in Article 12 (art. 12). For me it is only necessary to point to the word "everyone" at the beginning of Article 8 (art. 8), and to the absence of any idea of obligation to marry in Article 12 (art. 12), to show the wider meaning to be given to "family" in Article 8 (art. 8), in contrast to that term as used in Article 12 (art. 12). From the state of the law in Belgium it is clear that the principle "mater semper certa est" did not apply to Paula and Alexandra and that two steps were required to be taken, by recognition and adoption, before any partial approximation of the respective positions of mother and child to that of a married mother and a child of the marriage could be reached. The disadvantage occasioned to mother and daughter in the present case arose from the natural birth out of wedlock. This distinction in the degree of respect for the private and family life of Paula and Alexandra constituted, in my view, a discrimination prohibited by Article 14 (art. 14). Accordingly, the breach in this case has taken place under Article 8 and Article 14 (art. 8, art. 14), in respect of both applicants. I do not find it acceptable to extend so widely the terms of Article 8 (art. 8) as to cover rights of inheritance to the estates of Paula’s parents or brothers and sisters. My reason is to be found in the terms of the Article, which speaks of "the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence" and in my inability to include in these words expansive rights of succession and inheritance in respect of Paula’s parents and collaterals. This view seems to me to be reinforced when regard is had to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and to its express concern with property and "the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions". There is in the field of family law a marked change in many member States and an intention to carry out in whole or in part the proposals enshrined in the Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock. But the questions raised in the present case must be answered on the interpretation to be given to Article 8 (art. 8) and the relevant Belgian law. As that law stands, the distinction in the matters of recognition and adoption between the married mother and child and the unmarried mother