be tried without undue delay. According to the Applicant, such time in respect of both conviction and sentencing was unreasonable because the case was not complex and the delay was attributable to the Respondent State. In substantiating his allegation, the Applicant states that, after his arrest on 20 December 2003, it took the State Attorney almost two (2) years to charge him, one (1) year for the medical report ordered by the Court to be completed, two (2) years to hold the prelimary hearing after charges were filed, two (2) more years without explanation before the case was set for hearing, and, in all, six (6) and a half years after arrest before the prosecution called its first witness. 81. The Respondent State did not make any submission in respect of this allegation. *** 82. Pursuant to Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter, every individual shall have “the right to be tried within a reasonable time …”. 83. This Court has established that, in assessing whether justice was dispensed as prescribed under Article 7(1(d) of the Charter, factors to be considered should include the complexity of the case, the behaviour of the Parties, and that of the judicial authorities who must exercise due diligence especially where the Applicant faces severe penalties.21 What the Court is called to determine in the instant case is whether the period of six (6) and a half years that lapsed from the Applicant’s arrest before his trial commenced is reasonable. 84. Regarding the complexity of the case, the Court notes that, from the Respondent State’s response to the initial pleadings, and records of domestic proceedings, it is evident that the case was relatively ordinary. The matter did not demand extensive investigation as evidence was mainly made up of witness statements including those of two co-accused who were 21 Gozbert Henerico v. Tanzania (merits and reparations), § 82; Amini Juma v. Tanzania, op. cit., § 104; Armand Guehi v. Tanzania (merits and reparations), §§ 122-124. 22