institutions under the Organisations of African Unity has been used and as such it conforms to Article 56(3). 42. The State further argues that the communication is based on information disseminated through the mass media or author’s imaginations and as such not be admitted as stipulated under Article 56(4) which stipulates that communications should not be exclusively based on news disseminated through the mass media. The State adds that the communication does not state who was discriminated against or in which case a party was discriminated and by which judge, as a result the complaint is illusory and should not be admitted. The Complainants on their part argue that the communication has been compiled from affidavits and applications from the High and Supreme Court of Zimbabwe. 43. On the exhaustion of local remedies, the State argues that the Complainants have not exhausted the local remedies available to them, noting that all election petitions are dealt with speedily and that all the petitions referred to by the Complainants were dealt with, some were dismissed and some were withdrawn. The State indicates that it did nothing to frustrate the process as alleged by the Complainants noting that in cases of any frustration, the parties to the petition can approach the Judge President or the Chief Justice and the government has no role to play in election petitions. The State notes that most of the petitions to the High Court were dealt with in 2001; some were appealed to the Supreme Court. The Complainants argue that the exception to the rule on the basis of unduly prolonged procedure applies in this case. They argue that the delays in the finalisation of the petitions by the Supreme and High Courts were unreasonable and warrants, according to the Complainants, invoking of the exclusionary rule to the exhaustion of local remedies as they are non-existent. Commission’s decision on admissibility 44. In its jurisprudence the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) has articulated a framework for allocating the burden of proof between complainants/petitioners and respondent states. For purposes of seizure the complainant needs only to present a prima facie case and satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 56 of the Charter for admissibility. Once this has been done, the burden then shifts to the respondent state to submit specific responses and evidence refuting each and every one of the assertions contained in the complainant’s submissions. 45. In the present communications, the Complainants submit that the admissibility conditions in Article 56 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights have been fulfilled while the State argues that some have not been, in particularArticles 56(2), 56(3), 56(4) and 56(5). Regarding the compatibility of the communication as provided in Article 56(2), the African Commission notes that the communication establishes a prima facie violation of the provisions of the African Charter and is thus compatible with both the Constitutive Act and the African Charter. The communication alleges unreasonable delays in dealing with election petitions and as a consequence a violation of the right to fair trial under Article 7(1)(d) and to participate of government under Article 13 of the Charter. It is hard to find the incompatibility invoked by the State. 46. Article 56(3) requires that the communication is not written in an insulting or disparaging language. The State argues that by stating that the State has failed to guarantee the independence and competent functioning of the judiciary, and that the government has failed to observe the principle of separation of power, the Complainants have used disparaging language. The State argues further that the communication alleges that a judge resigned under pressure after ruling in favour of the MDC. The State concludes that the complaint is a misrepresentation of facts and full of false information which are insulting to the State and its judiciary – aimed at bring the State into disrepute and therefore does not conform to the provisions under Article 56(3). 47. A fundamental question that has to be addressed in the present communication is how far one can go in criticizing the judiciary or State institutions generally in the name of free expression, and whether the statement made by the Complainant constitutes insulting or disparaging language within the meaning of Article 56(3) of the African Charter. Indeed, the communication invites the Commission to clarify the ostensible relationship between freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of state institutions.