therefore be unreasonable to require the Applicant to file a new application before the domestic courts to seek redress for this claim.15 49. Concerning the Respondent State’s allegation that the Applicant should have considered filing a constitutional petition procedure at the High Court, the Court has consistently held that this remedy, in the Tanzanian judicial system, is an extraordinary remedy that Applicant is not required to exhaust prior to bringing their matters to this Court.16 50. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Applicant has exhausted local remedies as required under Article 56(5) of the Charter and Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules. B. Objection based on failure to file the Application within a reasonable time 51. The Respondent State asserts that the instant Application was not filed within a reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted. In this regard, the Respondent State asserts that it deposited the Declaration allowing the Applicant to file his case on 9 March 2010 and the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment on 7 March 2013. However, the Applicant seized the Court three (3) years later, on 25 July 2016, which according to the Respondent State was an unreasonable delay. 52. The Respondent State further concedes that the Rules and the Charter do not quantify what constitutes reasonable period of time. However, it maintains that a six (6) months limit is the period established by international human rights jurisprudence as reasonable. In support of its contention, the Respondent State relies on the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Majuru v. Zimbabwe. 15 Ibid, §§ 60-65. Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (3 June 2016) 1 AfCLR 599, § 72; Onyachi and Njoka v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 56. 16 14