submitted that it is in a better place to justify the necessity of the restriction to bail than the international judge. 148. The Court recalls that, it is trite law that a State cannot invoke its domestic laws to justify a breach of its international obligations. Resultantly, if a State relies on a provision of its domestic law to justify restriction of a right, such a State must be able to demonstrate that the provision(s) in its domestic law do not infringe the Charter.26 149. Furthermore, the Court has previously held that “…the scope of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national authorities will depend not only on the nature of the aim of the restriction but also on the nature of the right involved.27 Moreover, that the margin of appreciation must be applied in good faith”.28 150. The Court finds that the ousting of the jurisdiction of the judiciary in relation to the offences mentioned in Section 148(5)(a) of the CPA curtails the right to be heard. It divests the judiciary of their role as independent and impartial interpreters of the law. 151. In the instant case, the nature of Section 148(5) of the CPA does not give the judicial officer any choice as to the grant of bail once an accused person falls under one of the categories enumerated under Section 148(5) of the CPA. This effectively denies an accused person his right to be heard and especially to present his or her own unique circumstances that might allow the judicial officer to grant bail. 152. The Court recalls its jurisprudence that the adversarial principle and the principle of equality of arms require that all parties to a proceedings are given an equal chance to present their arguments and evidence and for an impartial arbiter to decide as to which party has proved their case according 26 Ibid, § 102. Christopher R. Mtikila v. Tanzania (merits) (14 June 2013) 1 AfCLR 34, § 106.2. 28 Mtikila v. Tanzania (merits), supra, § 106.3. 27 33