14 OTEGI MONDRAGON v. SPAIN JUDGMENT view of his or her dignity and integrity. This was especially so in the instant case, where the target of the remarks had a particular duty to adhere to and ensure adherence to the core values in question. 41. In the Government’s view, the Spanish courts had taken due account of the Court’s case-law on the subject. In that connection, they pointed out that the case-law of the Constitutional Court recognised the importance of freedom of expression as an essential guarantee of free public opinion, which was inextricably linked to democratic pluralism. However, the right to freedom of expression did not protect a supposed right to proffer insults and hence did not encompass vexatious remarks which were irrelevant and superfluous for the purposes of conveying the opinions or information concerned. Referring to the Court’s case-law (see Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103), the Government stressed that although the limits of permissible criticism were wider with regard to public figures, the latter’s reputation must also be protected for the purposes of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention even where the persons concerned were not acting in a private capacity. 42. The Government stressed the unique institutional position occupied by the King under the Spanish Constitution, pointing out that the King could not be held liable and that his neutral status in political debate under the Constitution meant that he was owed institutional respect of a kind that was “substantively” different from that due to other State institutions. 43. Even assuming that the limits of criticism of the King of Spain by a member of a regional parliament were wider, neither the Spanish Constitution nor the Convention could be deemed to recognise a right to proffer insults, in disregard of a person’s dignity. The Government agreed with the Spanish courts that the interference complained of had not been directed against the applicant’s anti-monarchy views but against specific expressions which had overstepped the bounds of legitimate exercise of the right to free expression, in breach of the King’s right to honour. Lastly, the Spanish courts had given ample reasons for the applicant’s conviction, in the light of the background to the case. 2. The Court’s assessment 44. It is not disputed between the parties that the applicant’s conviction amounted to “interference by public authority” with his right to freedom of expression. Such interference will infringe the Convention unless it satisfies the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It must therefore be determined whether it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve those aims.