68 issued an order to inform the President of Nicaragua of the non-compliance by the Minister of MARENA with Judgment No. 12 of February 27, 1997, for the latter to be ordered to duly comply with that order and, also, to report to the National Assembly of Nicaragua on the matter (supra para. 103 (q)). 131. In the course of examining simple, rapid, and effective mechanisms involved in the provision discussed, this Court has maintained that the procedural institution of amparo has the required characteristics to effectively protect fundamental rights50, that is, being simple and brief. In the Nicaraguan context, in accordance with the procedure established for amparo remedies in Law No. 49 published in La Gaceta No. 241, called “Amparo Law”, it should be decided within 45 days. 132. In the instant case, the first amparo remedy was filed before the Appellate Court of Matagalpa on September 11, 1995 and the court decision was reached on the 19 of that same month and year, that is, eight days later. Since that remedy was dismissed, on September 21, 1995 the representatives of the Community filed a remedy to appeal for review of fact as well as law before the Supreme Court of Justice, pursuant to article 25 of the Amparo Law. On February 27, 1997 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected that remedy. The Inter-American Court notes that the first of the abovementioned judicial decisions was reached within a reasonable time. However, processing the remedy filed for review of fact as well as law took one year, five months, and six days before it was decided by the Supreme Court of Justice. 133. The second amparo remedy was filed before the Civil Panel of the Appellate Court of the Sixth Region of Matagalpa on November 7, 1997, admitted by that court on the 12th of that same month and year, and decided by the Constitutional Panel of the Supreme Court of Justice on October 14, 1998. In other words, 11 months and seven days elapsed from the time the remedy was filed until a decision was reached on it. 134. In light of the criteria established on the subject by this Court, and bearing in mind the scope of reasonable terms in judicial proceedings51, it can be said that the procedure followed in the various courts which heard the amparo remedies in this case did not respect the principle of a reasonable term protected by the American Convention. According to the criteria of this Court, amparo remedies will be illusory and ineffective if there is unjustified delay in reaching a decision on them.52 135. Furthermore, the Court has already said that article 25 of the Convention is closely linked to the general obligation of article 1(1) of the Convention, which assigns protective functions to domestic law in the States Party, and therefore the State has the responsibility to designate an effective remedy and to reflect it in 50 cfr. Case of the Constitutional Court, supra note 10, para. 91 and Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (arts. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), supra note 46, para. 23. 51 cfr. Case of the Constitutional Court, supra note 10, para. 93; Paniagua Morales et al. case. Judgment of March 8, 1998. C Series No. 37, para. 152; and Genie Lacayo case. Judgment of January 29, 1997. C Series No. 30, para. 77. 52 cfr. Ivcher Bronstein case, supra note 9, para.137; Case of the Constitutional Court, supra note 10, para. 93; and Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (arts. 27.2, 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), supra note 46, para. 24.