Others (SC 39/07), already quoted above. In the light of those three judgments of the Supreme Court of the Respondent, we cannot but agree with learned Agent for the Applicant that the seizure and the sale of the property of the Applicant in the circumstances by the ABZ under the authority of the Act and the Constitution of the Respondent was in contravention of Articles 4(c) and 6(1) of the Treaty. As the Tribunal had held in the Mike Campbell v The Republic of Zimbabwe case already quoted above, after citing numerous authorities: "It is settled law that the concept of the rule of law embraces at least two fundamental rights, namely, the right of access to the courts and the right to a fair hearing before an individual is deprived of a right, interest or legitimate expectation... Article 4 (c) of the Treaty obliges Member States of SADC to respect principle of "human rights, democracy and the rule of law" and to undertake under Article 6 (1) of the Treaty "to refrain from taking any measure likely to jeopardize the sustenance of its principles, the achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Consequently, Member States of SADC, including the Respondent, are under a legal obligation to respect, protect and promote those twin fundamental rights". In Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2001 (1) SA 409 CC, the Constitutional Court of South Africa considered section 38(2) of the North West Agricultural Bank Act No. 14 of 1981 which is identical to the then section 40(2) of the Act which is now section 38(2), as indicated already. The Court held that section 38(2) of the North West Agricultural Bank Act was in contravention of section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which provides as follows:"Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum." The Court made the following pertinent observations which are applicable to the present case: (1) When the constitutional status of a law is impugned, the approach to determine its constitutionality is objective, not subjective. The subjective position in which the parties find themselves cannot affect the relevant enquiry as to whether the legislation in question complies or not with human rights standards and the rule of law. The Tribunal wishes to underline at this stage that in the present case the fact that the Applicant voluntarily signed the loan agreements which contained the standard clause 6, already mentioned above, could have no bearing on the issue as to whether or not section 40(2) of the Act and section 16(7)(d) of the Constitution of the Respondent comply with articles 4(c) and 6(1) of the Treaty, especially in view of the fact that the loan agreements derived their authority from, and are governed by, section 40(2) of the Act itself which in turn is sanctioned by section 16(7) (d) of the Constitution of the Respondent, as indicated already. (2) "A trial or hearing before a court or tribunal is not an end in itself. It is a means of determining whether a legal obligation exists and whether the coercive power of the State can be invoked to enforce an obligation, or prevent an unlawful act being committed. It serves other purposes as well, including that of institutionalizing the resolution of disputes, and preventing remedies being sought through self help. No one is entitled to take the law into her or his own hands. Self help, in this sense, is inimical to a society in which the rule of law prevails"- vide paragraph 11. (3) "An important purpose of section 34 is to guarantee the protection of the judicial process to persons who have disputes that can be resolved by law. Execution is a means of enforcing a judgment or order of court and is incidental to the judicial process. It is regulated by statute and the Rules of Court and is subject to the supervision of the court which has inherent jurisdiction to stay the execution if the interests of justice so require. If the debt itself is disputed, the seizure of property in execution of the debt must equally be disputed. To permit a creditor to seize property of a debtor without an order of court and to cause it to be sold by the creditor's agent on the condition stipulated by the creditor to secure payment of a debt denies to the debtor the protection of the judicial process and the supervision exercised by the court through its Rules over the process of execution. Yet this is what section 38 (2) purports to do. It entitles the Bank to seize and sell property in execution whether the debt alleged to be due is disputed or not" (the emphasis is ours)-vide paragraphs 13 and 14. (4) Section 38 (2) the North West Agricultural Bank "authorizes the Bank, an adversary of the debtor, to decide the outcome of the dispute. The Bank thus becomes a judge in its own cause. The authority to adjudicate over justiciable disputes and to order appropriate relief and the enforcement of the order by 6