In terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 41, no further documents may be submitted to the Tribunal by either party after the closure of pleadings except with the consent of the other party. The Applicant refused to consent, arguing, among other things, that the Respondent was in the habit of not following the Rules, pointing out that the Tribunal was only being indulgent when it allowed the Respondent a further period to file the defence because that should have been done earlier than April 23, 2009. We agree with this observation and would only add that it is high time parties respect the orders of the Tribunal. The application to file a Supplementary Affidavit is, therefore, rejected. This, however, does not settle the issue of jurisdiction because it is a question which we have to consider anyway in order to satisfy ourselves whether the matter is properly before us and that we have jurisdiction to hear it. We now proceed to do so. Under Article 15(2) of the Protocol on Tribunal (the Protocol), no person may bring an action against a Member State unless he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction. We have also referred to other international conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (the European Convention) and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (the African Charter), to mention but two. In Article 261 , it is provided as follows: "The Commission . . . may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law . . .". The African Charter, in Article 50, stipulates as follows: "The Commission can only deal with a matter submitted to it after making sure that all local remedies, if they exist, have been exhausted, unless it is obvious to the Commission that the procedure of achieving the remedies would have been unduly prolonged." We also recall the case of Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited v Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform and Resettlement (SC 49/07). The Supreme Court in Zimbabwe had dismissed Campbell's claim saying, among other things, that the question of what protection an individual should be afforded in the Constitution in the use and enjoyment of a private property, is a question of a political and legislative character, and that as to what property should be acquired and in what manner is not a judicial question. The Court went further and observed that, by the clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution, the legislature, in the proper exercise of its powers, had lawfully ousted the jurisdiction of the courts of law from any of the cases in which a challenge to the acquisition of agricultural land may be sought. We have also reproduced section 16(7) (d) of the Constitution of the Respondent above which provides, among other things, that nothing contained or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be in contravention of the Constitution to the extent that the law in question makes provision for the acquisition of any property or any interest or right therein, even as an incident of a contract, including a lease or mortgage, which has been agreed between the parties to the contract. We have also replicated section 38(2) of the Act above. That section authorizes the inclusion of a clause in a loan agreement entitling the lending institution to enter upon, and take possession of the whole or any part of, the security concerned and to dispose of it. The Supreme Court in Zimbabwe had held that in the circumstances where such clause is incorporated in a loan agreement, as is the case in the matter before us, the lending institution was entitled to proceed in terms of section 38(2) of the Act, without recourse to a court of law. Such indeed are the circumstances in which we must decide whether or not the Applicant in the present case has exhausted all available remedies or is unable to proceed, under the domestic jurisdiction. Under Article 21(b) of the Protocol, in addition to authorizing the Tribunal to develop its own jurisprudence, the Tribunal is instructed to do so, having regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public international law. In Mike Campbell (PVT) Limited and Others v The Republic of Zimbabwe (Case No. SADC (T) 11/08) when considering the question of exhaustion of local remedies, the Tribunal observed as follows: "The rationale for exhaustion of local remedies is to enable local courts to first deal with the matter because 4