218. The Respondent State also reminds the Court that it was under no obligation to follow such a resolutely participatory approach by organising the political dialogue. The Respondent State also did not consider it opportune to lock the political dialogue into strict terms of reference imposed on the other stakeholders. 219. Regarding the adoption of the Order by the President in March 2020 amending the law of 5'" of August 2019, the Respondent State notes that the change in the composition of the electoral body was not to establish a balance which did not exist. In the contrary, the alteration to the law was simply adopted in pursuance of its international human rights obligations to improve the standards of the electoral body even further. RK 220. Article 3 of the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol provides that the “bodies responsible for organising the elections shall be independent or neutral and shall have the confidence of all the political actors. national consultations shall be organised Where necessary, to determine appropriate the nature and the structure of the bodies. [emphasis added]’. 221. In its jurisprudence the Court has held “that institutional independence in itself is not sufficient to guarantee the transparent, free and fair elections advocated in the African Charter on Democracy and the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol. The electoral body in place should, in addition, be constituted according to law in a way that guarantees its independence and impartiality and should be perceived as such.”28 222. In line with jurisprudence Article 3 of the ECOWAS makes it clear that beyond Democracy Protocol, the Court’s the need for de jure guarantees of independence and impartiality, the Court also requires de facto respect for these principles supported by the perception of the public.” 23 Actions pour la Protection des Droits de l'Homme (APDH) v. Céte d'Ivoire (merits) (2016) 1 AfCLR 668, § 123. 24 Ibid, § 125. 48