56 MORICE v. FRANCE JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS The integrity of judicial proceedings must be demonstrated to all in no uncertain terms. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to adopt a concept of reasonableness that is as broad as possible, one that would encompass and accommodate even the most fastidious view of the appearance of things. It is “of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” (per Lord Hewart in Rex v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] KB 256, at 259). At the same time it is necessary to firmly exclude fanciful interpretations or propositions that are wholly unrealistic. In the present case there is no indication whatsoever that the judge in question had any connection with Judge M. other than that which all the other judges attending the meeting also had with her as a colleague. He used the first-person plural form, thus expressing collegial, not personal, support. He spoke in the context of a meeting of judges at which they collectively remonstrated about what was certainly a cavalier attitude on the part of the relevant ministry towards them. That attitude, having a more immediate and direct impact on Judge M., could be perceived as denoting contemptuous disregard for her. In this situation, language such as that used by the judge in question would merely be aimed at redressing the balance. He could certainly have made a better choice of words; but no one should have thought that his statement was intended to express a view on the merits of the pending disciplinary proceedings or, in other words, a value judgment on the manner in which Judge M. had acted. Moreover, what was said related exclusively to how Judge M. had, up until that point, dealt with the “Scientology” case. It had nothing at all to do with what was to happen later in the Borrel case. Nine years had passed since that statement had been made and, presumably, people had gone their separate ways. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that the Court of Cassation judge had any reason to hold, or that he might have held, any view as to how Judge M. had behaved or conducted her investigations in any of the cases assigned to her. Are judges then to be so distrusted that one might, in such circumstances, legitimately think that a judge’s impartiality could be doubted? To answer this question the Court must discern what view the public at large take of the integrity of judges. That is determinative of the respect in which they may be held and of the confidence that may or may not be reposed in them. Within limits, the greater the confidence the less one would be inclined to think that certain circumstances give rise to suspicion. Judges will themselves have contributed, over time, to the manner in which they are perceived. The concept of objective impartiality cannot, in my opinion, consist of a mere abstraction devised solely from principle, without regard to social realities which set practical standards. Judges may not be perfect – indeed, not all judges are perfect – but, even so, I have found it difficult to accept that one could seriously have thought that there was, in the present case, the possibility of an appearance of bias. One could, however, look at