42 111. With regard to habeas corpus, the Court has indicated on repeated occasions that, among the essential judicial guarantees, this recourse represents the effective means to guarantee the freedom, and control respect for the life and safety of persons, prevent their disappearance or the concealment of their place of detention, as well as to protect them from torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.85 112. In Guatemala, the appropriate recourse to recover the freedom of individuals detained in violation of judicial guarantees is the recourse known as “exhibición personal” (habeas corpus), embodied in Articles 263 and 264 of the Guatemalan Constitution.86 113. It has been proved that on July 24, 1992, two writs of habeas corpus were filed (supra paras. 58.14 and 58.15, one by the Guatemalan Archdiocesan Human Rights Office and another by the Guatemalan Ombudsman in order to discover the whereabouts of Maritza Urrutia. However, this did not obtain any results from the competent judicial authorities, so that these recourses were ineffective. 114. Maritza Urrutia was released on July 30, 1992, near the building of the Office of the Attorney General of Guatemala and, following the instructions of her captors, she went to the office of the then Attorney General, who received her and subsequently took her to the Fifth Criminal Trial Court, where she requested and signed a document in which she claimed amnesty. The court officials who attended the alleged victim did not ask about her situation or abduction (supra para. 58.9). 115. In this respect, the CEH Report indicated that “none of the judicial authorities investigated the legality of [the] detention” of Maritza Urrutia and that “the judge of the Fifth Trial Court did not question Maritza Urrutia about her capture and the detention conditions, or about her political affiliation. The victim states that the document which granted the amnesty had been drawn up before she came before the judge.”87 116. This Court has also established that Maritza Urrutia was in the power of State agents, so that the State was “obliged to create the necessary conditions for any recourse to be effective.”88 As we have seen, the two writs of habeas corpus filed in 85 Cf. Juan Humberto Sánchez case, supra note 14, para. 122; Bámaca Velásquez case, supra note 64, para. 192; and Cantoral Benavides case, supra note 75, para. 165. 86 Article 263 of the Guatemalan Constitution: “Whosoever shall be unlawfully imprisoned, detained or restrained in any way from the enjoyment of his individual freedom, or threatened with losing it, or shall suffer ill-treatment, even though his imprisonment or detention be lawful, has the right to request that he be brought immediately before the courts of justice, either so that his freedom may be recovered or guaranteed, or that the ill-treatment should be made to cease or that the coercion to which he was subjected should be terminated.” And Article 264: “[t]he authorities who order the concealment of the detainee or who refuse to bring him before the respective court, or who, in any way circumvent this guarantee, and also the executing agents, shall commit the offense of abduction and shall be punished in accordance with the law. If, as a result of the measures taken, the person in whose favor the writ of habeas corpus (exhibición) was filed is not found, the court, de officio, shall order immediately the necessary investigation of the case, until it has been clarified fully.” 87 Cf. Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, Guatemala, memoria del silencio, Tome VI, illustrative case No. 33, “Privación arbitraria de libertad y tortura de Maritza Urrutia”, pp. 245 to 250 (file of attachments to the application, attachment 2, folios 32 to 37). 88 Cf., Bulacio case, supra note 14, para. 127. Juan Humberto Sánchez case, supra note 14, para. 85; and Bámaca Velásquez case, supra note 64, para. 194.