custody is beyond the mandate of the Court, as this Court is not an appellate court and does not have criminal appellate jurisdiction whatsoever, to quash the decision of the Respondent State’s national courts and release prisoners from prison. The Respondent State, therefore, considers that the Applicant’s prayer should be dismissed. * 21. The Applicant disputes the Respondent State’s claims and asserts that the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter because his claims directly relate to rights guaranteed in the Charter, to which the Respondent State is a party. The Applicant further submits that examining a state’s compliance with its international obligations does not amount to the Court sitting as an appellate court. Accordingly, the Applicant is not asking the Court to sit as an appellate court, but rather invoking the Court’s jurisdiction under the Charter to determine if the conduct he impugns constitutes a violation of the Charter. Consequently, the Applicant requests the Court to dismiss the Respondent State’s the objections. *** 22. The Court recalls that under Article 3(1) of the Protocol, it has jurisdiction to examine any application submitted to it, provided that the rights of which a violation is alleged, are protected by the Charter or any other human rights instrument ratified by the Respondent State.6 23. The Court emphasises that its material jurisdiction is thus predicated on the Applicant’s allegation of violations of human rights protected by the Charter or any other human rights instrument ratified by the Respondent State. 7 In the instant matter, the Applicant alleges violation of Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Charter. 6 Kalebi Elisamehe v. United Republic of Tanzania (judgment) (26 June 2020) 4 AfCLR 265, § 18. Diocles William v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (21 September 2018) 2 AfCLR 426, § 28; Armand Guéhi v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 477 § 33; Elisamehe v. Tanzania, ibid, § 18. 7 8