availed to give credence to these allegations. 97. The Respondent State also states that the Complainant states: "all these facts were not contested by the Government during oral argument as the Government's representatives conceded that they could not say what kind of torture the Complainant suffered in police Custody."6 The Respondent State wants the African Commission to know and put on record that no such concessions were ever made by the Respondent State. It also draws the attention of the African Commission that there was no oral argument held in this Communication and if it was held in the absence of the Respondent State, this was procedurally irregular. The Respondent State asserts that it received the Complainant's submissions on Admissibility after seizure and responded. 98. It states that the African Commission ruled that the Communication was to be Admissible and advised the Respondent State to this effect calling on it to file its submissions on the Merits. The Respondent State says that it has not submitted itself to any hearing where oral argument was presented in respect of this Communication. The Respondent State says that the Complainant intends to mislead the African Commission on this aspect. It urges the African Commission to make a finding that, in respect of this Communication as provided for in the Rules of the Charter, that the Complainant has not provided any evidence to support the allegations. 99. The Respondent State also states that the Complainant mischievously alleges that the Respondent State commits torture with impunity and proceeds to cite persons he alleges were tortured. It submits that these are personal views which should not be taken as evidence. It also states that it would appear that these allegations on persons allegedly tortured as stated by Complainant are based on newspaper reports which are specifically barred in terms of Article 56 (4) of the Charter. 100. The Respondent State submits that in the absence of evidence (either tangible of documentary) the allegations that the Respondent State violated Article 5 of the Charter should be dismissed. It is also states that it is trite law that 'he who alleges must prove.' The Respondent State argues that the Complainant has dismally failed to substantiate the allegations of torture by providing evidence and a finding should be made that Respondent State did not violate the article in question. 101. The Respondent State also argues that the fact that Victim is said to have received counseling for trauma at the Centre for Studies for Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa is not proof that he was tortured. It admits that the Victim was arrested and detained for a crime and brought to court within the statutory period and that the Victim did not make any report or complaint to the magistrate about the alleged torture. It states that perhaps it could be the fact that the Victim's arrest may have traumatized him and not because of any ill treatment. It states that the police were carrying out their duties when they arrested the Victim and the nature of the offence was of such a serious nature that the circumstances required that Victim be placed in custody. The Respondent State submits that the arrest was lawful. Respondent State Rebuttal of Article 6 102. In terms of Article 6, the Respondent State argues that this article protects persons from arbitrary arrest. It goes on to define 'arbitrary' as stated in the Oxford English Dictionary thus: "To be decided by one's liking; dependent upon will or pleasure; at this discretion or option of any one; derive from mere opinion or preference; not based on the nature of things; hence capricious, uncertain, varying." The Respondent State argues that the Victim was arrested on 14 January 2003 and brought to court on 16 January 2003 for contravening section 5(2) (a) (1) of the Public Order Security Act (Chapter 11:17). It states that on his first day in court, he was legally represented and the charges were read in open court and no challenge was made as to the appropriateness of the charges. It states that the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (Chapter 9:07) allows a police officer to arrest: "any person whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of having committed any of the offences mentioned in the first schedule." 103. The Respondent State argues that it is up to the court to make a finding as to whether the arrest by the police officer was reasonable in the circumstances. It goes on to say that when the court placed the Victim on remand and advised him to apply for bail in the High Court, it was confirming that there existed reasonable grounds for the Victim's arrest. It concludes that the arrest therefore, cannot be described as arbitrary in the circumstances. It also argues that the reckoning of time by Victim is flawed for a person with legal training. It states that Section 33(2) of the Interpretation Act, (Chapter 1:01) provides: "Where in an enactment a period of time is expressed to begin on or to be reckoned from a particular day, that day shall not be included in the period." The Respondent State argues that the Victim was arrested on 14 January 2003 and brought to court on 16 January 2003 and therefore the statutory limit of forty-eight (48) hours had 11