117. The Respondent State further avers that the grant of bail by the High Court to the Victims is proof that the siege did not affect the independence of the judiciary. The fact that the Judiciary refused to be intimidated cannot be used as a defence by the State. What is of concern here to the Commission is the intention of the Respondent State through the deployment of security forces, as opposed to the result achieved by such actions. 118. The Commission notes the information contained in Constitutional Petition No.18 of 2005 referred to in the Complainants’ submission that the security forces entered the criminal registry and cells and interrupted the processing of the bail order of the Victims. The Commission further notes that the head of the Judiciary was not consulted prior to the deployment. While the State has the duty and right to ensure national security, the current circumstances do not point to a bona fide security concern. 119. The Commission finds that the actions of the security forces are not reflective of their avowed aim of protecting national security, but rather the aim was to ensure the continued detention of the Victims through the intimidation of the judiciary. The manner in which the security forces behaved constituted a threat to the independence of the Judiciary and was calculated to induce fear in the judicial personnel, by reminding them of the reach and might of the State. 120. The Commission notes that under the principle of separation of powers, the assessment of the security situation in the Courtroom falls under the responsibility of the presiding Judge. Accordingly, if there were security concerns on the possibility of the Victims escaping from the Courtroom, the presiding Judge would be the one to request additional security, or at the very least should have been consulted before the deployment of the security forces. In the absence of this, the actions of the security forces amount to intimidation of the Judiciary. 121. For these reasons, the Commission finds that the deployment of the armed men in the premises of the Court aimed at interfering with the independence and impartiality of the Court, thereby violating the right of the Victims’ to a fair trial under Article 7(1) of the Charter.  Article 7(1)(b) and (d) 122. The Complainants further submit that charging the Victims with two different set of offences before both the High Court and the General Court Martial on the same sets of facts contravenes the right to a fair trial and to a fair hearing. The Complainants refer to Articles 28(1) and 44(c) of the Ugandan Constitution. Article 28(1) of the Ugandan Constitution states: “In the determination of civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge, a person shall be entitled to a fair, speedy and public hearing before an independent and impartial court or tribunal established by law.” Article 44(c) of the Ugandan Constitution states: “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, there shall be no derogation from the enjoyment of the following rights 21