inconsistences which renders the evidence inconclusive on one critical issue: whether the Complainant was indeed in Djibouti. This is a critical point in the present Communication given the Respondent State’s denial of the Complainant’s presence in its territory, and the reasonable probability that the Complainant might have been in any of the other states in the Horn of Africa and its proximity which allegedly participated in the US Government’s rendition program. 176. Proof of the Complainant’s presence in Djibouti is a critical for the finding that the he was within the territorial jurisdiction or indeed under the effective control or authority of the Republic of Djibouti. It is on such a finding that the Communication’s compatibility with the Charter ratione loci would be founded.. 177. On the available material, to the extent that the Complainant has not conclusively established his presence in the Respondent State’s territory or that he was otherwise under its effective control or authority, the Commission is not convinced that Article 56(2) of the Charter is satisfied. 178. There is a further point regarding the Commission’s competence to consider the present Communication. The Respondent State argues that the Commission cannot adjudicate upon the present Communication because in doing so it would have to determine the propriety of the conduct of the United States of America which is not and cannot be a Party to the African Charter and to the present Communication. The Respondent State relies on the Case of the Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) (Preliminary Question) (1954) ICJ. 179. The Commission observes that the Complainant alleges that he was tortured, among other violations of his rights. The prohibition of torture is a jus cogens rule of international law. One of the obligations of states concomitant to the prohibition of torture in this regard is that a state is prohibited to deport, extradite, or expel a person to another state where he will or is likely to be subjected to torture.25 The mere fact that the receiving state which would execute the torture is not party to the Charter or indeed in the relevant proceedings does not absolve the sending state from accounting for its own act of sending the victim to the third state under the Charter. ACHPR/ Res. 61(XXXII) 02 (2002): Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (Robben Island Guidelines) 25 36