61. The third argument of the Complainant raises the issue of the retroactive application of the 1991 CPA which made it difficult for the Victim to exhaust local remedies at the time. The violations alleged commenced on 30 June 1989 during which period Decree No. 2 of June 1989 applied. When the Act was adopted in 1991, it had a retroactive effect in the sense that, the criminal offence of torture which was the essence of the Victim's Complaint retroactively became subject to a limitation period of two (2) years, expiring in 1994. In this connection, the Victim or his lawyer could not bring the matter before any courts at the time because as a matter of fact, they were time barred and consequently, access to courts was denied by virtue of the Act. 62. Even though the Respondent State contends that other cases were entertained by the courts during that period,31 the Commission notes that the cases referred relate to murder, while the subject matter of the Victim's Complaint is torture which was statute barred. In this regard, the Commission finds that remedies were not available to the Victim at the time. 63. The questions that may arise at this point is why the Victim did not approach the courts after the limitation period expired in 1994, and why he took the matter directly to the Constitutional Court in 2006 without approaching the other courts? 64. In response to these questions: Firstly, it is worth reiterating that the Victim left the country for fear of persecution in 1991 and only returned in 2002.32 On this ground, the Commission's jurisprudence has shown that fear of persecution is one of the exceptions used to waive the requirement to exhaust local remedies. In the Jawara Case33 the Commission ruled that -The existence of a remedy must be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which, it will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Therefore, if the applicant cannot turn to the judiciary of his country because of generalized fear for his life (or even those of his relatives), local remedies would be considered to be unavailable to him." Accordingly, the Victim could not be required to approach the courts at the time. 65. Secondly, other laws such as the 1991 CPA and the National Security Act were adopted which hindered litigation before Sudanese courts, especially against NISS members who are the alleged perpetrators of the violations in the instant Communication. 66. Thirdly, as already discussed above, there are substantial grounds to believe that the political situation and state of emergency at the time hindered the Victim's access to the courts. When the political situation improved, the Victim could not approach the courts to prosecute the alleged perpetrators due to the immunity they enjoyed under the CPA and the National Security Act. It was practical for the matter to be taken directly to the Constitutional Court for the latter to rule on the unconstitutionality of the Acts. Thus, since the Respondent State forfeited its prerogative to deal with the matter domestically, the Commission considers that the requirement to exhaust all local remedies must be dispensed with. 67. Based on the above reasoning, the Commission holds that all local remedies could not be exhausted in the present Communication because they were not available, adequate and effective. Hence, the Complainant has constructively exhausted local remedies pursuant to Article 56(5) of the African Charter. 68. The last issue in contention is the requirement under Article 56(6) of the African Charter which provides that "Communications received by the Commission will be considered if they are submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted, or from the date the Commission is seized with the matter..." 69. The Respondent State submits that the Communication does not comply with the requirement under Article 56(6) because it was not submitted within a reasonable period of time, since it mentions allegations dating back to 1989. 70. The Complainant contends that Article 56(6) has been complied with because the material date for exhaustion of local remedies was 2009, not 1989. It avers that the Victim's initial Complaint of February 1990 had been pending for several years during which no remedies were available to challenge the failure of the authorities to investigate. This situation only changed in 2005 with the adoption of a new Constitution which enabled the Victim to raise the legal issues surrounding the lack of effective remedies by way of a constitutional challenge in 2006. 71. Before the Commission proceeds to analyze whether the Communication was submitted within a reasonable period of time, it is important to underline the fact that reasonable time does not pertain to the period when the allegations were committed as submitted by the Respondent State. It is computed from the time when the Communication was submitted to the Commission after exhaustion of local remedies, or when the Complainant immediately realizes that local remedies are not available, sufficient or effective. 72. As opposed to the Inter-American and European Human Rights Systems which prescribe 6 months as a reasonable time period, the African Charter does not have provisions or definition with respect to 8