can be replaced by any other officer if he/she proves to be non-performer …”. 103. Overall, the Respondent State has also invoked the margin of appreciation as justifying the leverage that it has, as a sovereign state, to design an electoral system that best suits its political, social, economic and cultural conditions. *** 104. The Court notes that the Applicants’ challenge the fact that the Respondent State’s Electoral Commission utilises civil servants for its administrative and operational requirements. Specifically in contest in the present matter is the use of civil servants, of various ranks, as returning officers. 105. The Court finds it important to point out that the use of civil servants in the operations of an electoral management body is not, by itself, inimical to the independence, autonomy and accountability of an electoral management body. Whether or not the involvement of civil servants compromises the independence of the electoral management body will, therefore, depend on the peculiar facts of each situation. As a minimum standard of acceptable conduct, however, if civil servants are involved in the operations of an electoral management body, it is important to safeguard their independence by, for example, requiring that they should be reporting directly and only to the electoral management body and not to anyone or any other entity outside. 106. In respect of the appointment of every city director, municipal director, town director and district executive director as returning officers under section 7(1) of the NEA, the Applicants contend that this violates the Charter because the appointees are all, in their positions, after being chosen by the President. The Court, however, reiterates that a lack of impartiality on particular officer bearers cannot be deduced simply from the fact that a person is appointed by the President. 29