particular positions so as to ensure that staff are not in a position of a conflict of interest. 83. In the present case, the Court finds it anomalous that the Respondent State’s laws contain no provisions stipulating the qualifications that one must fulfil to be appointed a Director of Elections. The Court holds that, in relation to the head of the Electoral Commission’s secretariat, it behoves the Respondent State to appoint individuals of the highest calibre who can independently, impartially and transparently coordinate the management of the electoral process. However, without a clearly laid out qualifications scheme, it is not clear the considerations that the appointing authority takes into mind when appointing a Director of Elections. This exposes the process not only to uncertainty but also the possible consideration of irrelevant factors. 84. The Court thus holds that section 6(1) of the NEA, in so far as it fails to prescribe the qualifications of persons who can be appointed as Director of Elections, violates Article 13(1) of the Charter. 85. The above notwithstanding, and as earlier alluded to, the Court must also determine whether the provisions of section 6(1) of the NEA are a justifiable limitation as stipulated under Article 27(2) of the Charter. 86. While the absence of a prescribed criteria for persons who can be appointed as Director of Elections is contained in a clearly expressed law which is of general application, the Court finds that the restriction occasioned by section 6(1) does not have a clear legitimate purpose and neither is it a proportionate means of restricting the rights under Article 13(1) of the Charter. The absence of qualification criteria, the Court holds, lends itself to the creation of a perception that the Electoral Commission may recommend, and the appointing authority appoint, someone whose competence may be ill-suited to the running of the Electoral Commission. 24