the Complainants Submissions, the lack of structural independence has been achieved through a series of coercion, co-option, and rewards thus making the judiciary dependent on the executive." The judiciary's lack of structural independence is further evidenced by its lack of power to interpret the Constitution and review the actions and laws of the executive and legislative organs." The Complainants further submitted that there is no genuine prospect of success since the judiciary lack functional independence. The Ethiopian judiciary is structured in such a way that it cannot second-guess the executive and where that happens punishment is meted out against the judge." 49. The Complainants submitted that since the Ethiopian legal system does not allow for plea bargaining except in the limited context of anti-corruption procedures, the release of some of the Complainants without providing sufficient justification is illustrative of the arbitrary nature of decisions-making aimed at appeasing the critics of the trials, which are politically motivated. 50. The Complainants submitted that some Victims have been convicted in the Ethiopian judiciary relying on confessions obtained via torture and in violation of fair trial guarantees under Ethiopian laws. The Complainants further submitted that the According to the Complainants submissions, the reliance on the executive by the judiciary has been achieved through the following tactics: Control of the budget of the judiciary by the executive, which has led to in one instance the refusal by ministry of finance to effect an increase in the salaries of judges having been approved by the Judicial Administrative Council; and the use of federal and state Judicial Administration Councils/Commissions whose membership is dominated by members of EPRDF and exercises such powers including disciplinary hearings, promotions, and suspensions of its members. The Complainants further submit that the independence of the judiciary administratively has been weakened further since membership to the ruling party, EPRDF, has become a necessity for judicial appointment and tenure. The government is pursuing two large scale campaigns targeted at recruiting judges to be members of the ruling party. The first campaign has been for the past two decades where the Civil Service College's law department has enrolled and quickly graduated members of the ruling party and former rebel fighters including prominent politicians, without apparent regard for qualifications and aptitude. Relatedly, the Complainants submit that even though not pursued rigorously, the government also considered taking over the regular law schools in the country and make them into institutions that produce non-independent and regime-compliant professionals. The second large scale campaign relies on the judicial training institutes, which is aimed at bringing those who have graduated from law schools into the influence of the government by requiring that they be trained in one of these institutions in order to become a judge or a prosecutor. According to the complainants' submission, these institutions have been key recruitment and vetting grounds and those found non-compliant are filtered out. The Complainants further submit that the campaigns were seen to be indispensable following the 2005 crisis. The government wanted to ensure that the judiciary was even more reliable to deliver what is needed by the EPRDF.The Complainants submit that the government also practices judicial purges, which can sometimes be severe as that of 1994-1995where 1000 were fired from the judiciary by EPRDF for political reasons. In most cases, judges in Ethiopia find it hard to resign and some of them opt to walk away. Some of them remain unemployed for more than two years thereby suffering the indignities of livelihood challenges. 8 For example, in 2008, the judiciary was ousted from reviewing some of the decisions of the director of Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority via a regulation passed by a Council of Ministers. 9 In practice, the judiciary protects the government from both internal and external criticisms by situating its repressive policies within the framework of law and legality. The interference in the work of the judiciary is common and the most blatant cases include government officials write letters to judges relinquishing them of their offices, dictating the decision of the judges, ordering the reduction of judge's salaries, refusal to enforce judicial ~ec.isio~s ~n.d in extreme cases ~he impris~nment of judges in retaliation for u~avour~~le deCislo~. The Ethiopian judiciary also plays a critical role 111 power struggles between the vanous po . ~al forces 'ill' Ethiopian government since the current government came into power. According to th mplainants' submission, the post-200S high profile political trials were aimed at mobilising public 0 ::ion against, its ~olitical adversaries. Those targeted include opposition politicians, journalists, and civic le I ~ rs and hum~n nghts defenders. ':! .... ~. A -U 7 7 ~ ~<>.::\ C)~\ -:)'., ~~) 'l (>.,. V ..q'·RICI>.\"'~ 6 .: ;:c: ;' t). :Jt ~ ~.;, <.."'" I O"'Mf ET (\l. C ~. ..;:,<: .... :. "