into account in assessing the reasonableness of the time frame for filing the Applications is the period commencing from 2013, the date on which the public would have known about the existence of the Court, to 2018, the year in which the Application was filed, which period is four years.13 60. The Court recalls its jurisprudence that “… the reasonableness of the timeframe for seizure depends on the specific circumstances of the case and should be determined on a case-by-case basis.” In assessing reasonableness, this Court has previously considered, inter alia, the fact that an applicant is incarcerated, on death row, limited mobility and access to information, lay in law, had not received legal assistance, and had no knowledge of the existence of the Court.14 61. In the present case, the Court notes that the Applicant was incarcerated and on death row since his sentencing in 1999, resulting in limited movement and access to information and, therefore, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, the perceived delay of filing the Application before the Court was justified. 62. Given these findings, the Court holds that the Applicant filed the present Application within a reasonable time as construed under Article 56(6) of the Charter whose provisions are restated in Rule 52(2)(f) of the Rules and thus dismisses the Respondent State’s objection on this point. C. Other conditions of admissibility 63. The Court notes that there is no contention regarding compliance with the conditions set out in Rule 50(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (g) of the Rules. Even so, it must satisfy itself that these conditions are met. 13 Igola Iguna v. United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR, Application No. 020/2017, Judgment of 1 December 2022 (merits and reparations), § 39. 14 Chrizostom Benyoma v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (30 September 2021) 5 AfCLR 360, § 60; Amini Juma v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (30 September 2021) 5 AfCLR 431, § 60. 16