66 The creation of the VRS by the FRY/VJ, therefore, did not indicate an intention by Belgrade to relinquish the control held by the FRY/VJ over the Bosnian Serb army. To the contrary, in fact, the establishment of the VRS was undertaken to continue the pursuit of the FRY’s own political and military objectives, and the evidence demonstrates that these objectives were implemented by military and political operations that were controlled by Belgrade and the JNA/VJ. There is no evidence to suggest that these objectives changed on 19 May 1992.187 152. Taken together, these factors suggest that the relationship between the VJ and VRS cannot be characterised as one of merely coordinating political and military activities. Even if less explicit forms of command over military operations were practised and adopted in response to increased international scrutiny, the link between the VJ and VRS clearly went far beyond mere coordination or cooperation between allies and in effect, the renamed Bosnian Serb army still comprised one army under the command of the General Staff of the VJ in Belgrade. 188 It was apparent that even after 19 May 1992 the Bosnian Serb army continued to act in pursuance of the military goals formulated in Belgrade. In this regard, clear evidence of a chain of military command between Belgrade and Pale was presented to the Trial Chamber and the Trial Chamber accepted that the VRS Main Staff had links and regular communications with Belgrade. 189 In spite of this, and although the Trial Chamber acknowledged the possibility that certain members of the VRS may have been specifically 187 See in particular ibid., para. 116 (citing the 1993 publication of the former Yugoslav Federal Secretary for Defence, General Veljko Kadijevi}, entitled My view of the Break-up: an Army without a State (Prosecution Exhibit 30)): “?Tghe units and headquarters of the JNA formed the backbone of the army of the Serb Republic (Republic of Srpska) complete with weaponry and equipment […] ?Fgirst the JNA and later the army of the Republic of Srpska, which the JNA put on its feet, helped to liberate Serb territory, protect the Serb nation and create the favourable military preconditions for achieving the interests and rights of the Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina…”. See also para. 590: “The occupation of Kozarac and of the surrounding villages was part of a military and political operation, begun before 19 May 1992 with the take-over of the town of Prijedor of 29 April 1992, aimed at establishing control over the opština which formed part of the land corridor of Bosnian territory linking the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the so-called Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia.” 188 While the relationship between the JNA and VRS may have included coordination and cooperation, it cannot be seen as limited to this. As the Trial Chamber itself noted: “In 1991 and on into 1992 the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb paramilitary forces cooperated with and acted under the command and within the framework of the JNA.”(ibid., para. 593; emphasis added). 189 Ibid., para. 598: “The Trial Chamber has already considered the overwhelming importance of the logistical support provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the VRS. […] [I]n addition to routing all high-level VRS communications through secure links in Belgrade, a Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999