64 persisted after the redesignation of the VRS and the continuous payment of salaries to officers of the Bosnian Serb army by the FRY) is that the VRS and VJ did not, after May 1992, comprise two separate armies in any genuine sense. This is further evidenced by the following factors: (i) The re-organization of the JNA and the change of name did not point to an alteration of military objectives and strategies. The command structure of the JNA and the re-designation of a part of the JNA as the VRS, while undertaken to create the appearance of compliance with international demands, was in fact designed to ensure that a large number of ethnic Serb armed forces were retained in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 181 (ii) Over and above the extensive financial, logistical and other assistance and support which were acknowledged to have been provided by the VJ to the VRS, it was also uncontested by the Trial Chamber that as a creation of the FRY/VJ, the structures and ranks of the VJ and VRS were identical, and also that the FRY/VJ directed and supervised the activities and operations of the VRS.182 As a result, the VRS reflected the strategies and tactics devised by the FRY/JNA/VJ. 181 In the light of the demand of the Security Council on 15 May 1992 that all interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately, the Trial Chamber characterised the dilemma posed for the JNA by increasing international scrutiny from 1991 onwards in terms of the way in which the JNA could: “be converted into an army of what remained of Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro, yet continue to retain in Serb hands control of substantial portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina while appearing to comply with international demands that the JNA quit Bosnia and Herzegovina. […] The solution as far as Serbia was concerned was found by transferring to Bosnia and Herzegovina all Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in JNA units elsewhere while sending all non-Bosnian soldiers out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This ensured seeming compliance with international demands while effectively retaining large ethnic Serb armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina“ (Judgement, paras. 113-114). Additionally, the U.N. Secretary-General, in commenting on its purported withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina, concluded in his report of 3 December 1992 that “[t]hough JNA has withdrawn completely from Bosnia and Herzegovina, former members of Bosnian Serb origin have been left behind with their equipment and constitute the Army of the ‘Serb Republic’” (Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. Doc. A/47/747, para. 10). 182 Judgement, para. 115: “?Tghe VRS was in effect a product of the dissolution of the old JNA and the withdrawal of its nonBosnian elements into Serbia. However, most, if not all, of the commanding officers of units of the old JNA who found themselves stationed with their units in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 May 1992, nearly all Serbs, remained in command of those units throughout 1992 and 1993 […]”. See further ibid., para. 590: “The attack on Kozarac was carried out by elements of an army Corps based in Banja Luka. This Corps, previously a Corps of the old JNA, became part of the VRS and was renamed the ‘Banja Luka’ or ‘1st Krajina’ Corps after 19 May 1992 but retained the same commander.” See also ibid., paras. 114-116, 118-121, 594. Case No.: -94-1-A 15 July 1999