VII     consideration will entail (paragraphs 35-51). In so doing, the Court hardly evoked the condition, albeit fundamental, regarding the decisive influence that the new evidence must exert on the judgment for which revision is being sought (paragraph 49), and the no less fundamental condition that the Applicants must not be negligent in not being within the knowledge of the evidence in question before the delivery of the judgment (paragraph 50). The Court did not draw any conclusion with respect to this latter condition and then reverted (paragraph 51) to its finding as expressed in paragraph 49, apparently making the said finding the ground for its decision. A more systematic approach would, without doubt, have provided greater clarity to the Court’s reasoning in the present judgment. * 23. The recourse to revision of a judgment of the Court, by its very nature and purport, should be exercised and be accepted exceptionally in a way to avoid undermining the principle of the authority of a matter already judged (res judicata) embodied in the decisions of the Court and any other judicial organ.18 It is indeed necessary not to endanger legal certainty by encouraging the parties not satisfied with a judgment of the Court to request a revision of such a judgment. 24. For an Application for Revision not to be transformed into an ordinary appeal procedure not prescribed by the Protocol, such application must conform to strict conditions which must equally be strictly interpreted by the Court. For the purpose of ensuring the proper use of the revision remedy, it is absolutely necessary that potential litigants before the Court be cognizant of the real meaning of the texts governing this extraordinary remedy. 25. Predictability of procedural standards is surely a guarantee for legal certainty, and for such standards to be predictable, they must be clear and intelligible. Pending a possible amendment of the Rules governing the question of revision in particular,19 such clarification must be made through the judicial                                                                                                                 18 This has been emphasized by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the following terms: “The legal motives envisaged as reasons for the remedy of revision are restrictive in nature, inasmuch as the remedy is always directed against orders that have acquired the effect of res judicata, that is, against judgments of a decisive nature or interlocutory judgments that are passed and put an end to the proceeding”, Case of Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua (Application for Judicial Review of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs), op. cit., p. 5, paragraph 11; see also, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 13416/87, Matter of Pardo v. France (Revision), judgment of 10 July 1996, p. 9, paragraph 21. 19  For reasons of legal certainty, it will also be desirable to introduce a time limit within which every Application for Revision must be submitted; see for example Article 25 (4) of the Protocol establishing the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States, which provides for a deadline of five years; see also Article 61 (5) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice or Article 48 (5) of the Protocol on the Statute of the African