66 GIULIANI AND GAGGIO v. ITALY JUDGMENT (b) Application of these principles to the present case 252. The Court notes first of all that the demonstrations surrounding the G8 summit in Genoa degenerated into violence. On 20 July 2001 numerous clashes took place between the law-enforcement agencies and a section of the demonstrators. This is amply demonstrated by the video footage produced by the parties. These images also show violence being perpetrated by some police officers against demonstrators (see paragraph 139 above). 253. The fact remains, however, that the present application does not concern the organisation of the public-order operations during the G8 as a whole. It is confined to examining, among other things, whether, in the organisation and planning of that event, failings occurred which can be linked directly to the death of Carlo Giuliani. In that connection it should be noted that violent incidents had been observed well before the tragic events on Piazza Alimonda. In any event, there are no objective grounds for believing that, had those violent incidents not occurred, and had the Tute Bianche march not been charged by the carabinieri, M.P. would not have fired shots to defend himself against the unlawful violence to which he was being subjected. The same conclusion must be reached as regards the changes to the instructions issued to the carabinieri on the eve of the events and the choice of communications system. 254. The Court observes in that regard that the intervention of the carabinieri on Via Caffa (see paragraphs 42-44 above) and the attack on the jeep by demonstrators took place at a time of relative calm when, following a long day of clashes, the detachment of carabinieri had taken up position on Piazza Alimonda in order to rest, regroup and allow the injured officers to board the jeeps. As the footage shows, the clash between demonstrators and law-enforcement officers occurred suddenly and lasted only a few minutes before the fatal shooting. It could not have been predicted that an attack of such violence would take place in that precise location and in those circumstances. Moreover, the reasons which drove the crowd to act as it did can only be speculated upon. 255. It should also be noted that the Government had deployed considerable numbers of personnel to police the event (18,000 officers – see paragraphs 141 and 237 above) and that all the personnel either belonged to specialised units or had received ad hoc training in maintaining order during mass gatherings. M.P., in particular, had taken part in training courses in Velletri (see paragraphs 108-109 and 237 above; contrast Makaratzis, cited above, § 70). In view of the very large numbers of officers deployed on the ground, they could not all be required to have lengthy experience and/or to have been trained over several months or years. To hold otherwise would be to impose a disproportionate and unrealistic obligation on the State. Furthermore, as the Government rightly stressed (see paragraph 233 above), a distinction has to be made between cases where the law-enforcement agencies are dealing with a precise and identifiable target (see, for instance,