GIULIANI AND GAGGIO v. ITALY JUDGMENT 61 which M.P. had been travelling, which was driven by another carabiniere, had driven twice over the body of the victim, who had been shot but was still alive. (b) The Government 230. The Government observed that Carlo Giuliani's death had resulted from the individual action taken by M.P., which had not been ordered or authorised by his superior officers. It had therefore been an unforeseen and unforeseeable reaction. The conclusions of the investigation ruled out any responsibility on the part of the State, including indirect responsibility on account of supposed shortcomings in the organisation or management of the public-order operations. The “problems” referred to by the public prosecutor in the request for the proceedings to be discontinued, in particular on account of the organisational changes made the night before the events (see paragraph 67 above), had not been specified nor had their existence been established. 231. In any event, there was no indication of any error of assessment in the organisation of the operation which could be linked to the events at issue. It was not possible to establish a causal link between the death of Carlo Giuliani and the attack on the Tute Bianche march, which had “nothing to do” with the events on Piazza Alimonda. Nor were there any grounds for asserting that the contingent of carabinieri should not have been sent to Piazza Alimonda, been given time to regroup and been deployed to deal with the demonstrators. 232. What distinguished the present case from Ergi v. Turkey (28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV), Oğur v. Turkey ([GC], no. 21594/93, ECHR 1999-III) and Makaratzis (cited above) was the fact that, in the context of the G8, the planning of operations had inevitably been incomplete and approximate, given that the demonstrators could either have remained peaceful or have engaged in violence. The authorities had been unable to predict in detail what would happen and had to ensure that they could intervene in a flexible manner, which was difficult to plan for. 233. Likewise, the principles articulated in McCann and Others and Andronicou and Constantinou (both cited above) had no bearing on the present case, since they related to a policing operation with a precise target rather than an urban guerrilla-type situation lasting three days, which was in constant flux and was spread over an entire city. In the latter situation, preventive planning was impossible as the decisions were taken by the commanding officers on the ground in the light of the scale of the violence and the dangers. 234. The demonstrations in Genoa should have been peaceful and lawful. The video footage showed that most of the demonstrators had acted within the law and without recourse to violence. The authorities had done everything in their power to prevent disruptive elements from mingling with