CASTELLS v. SPAIN JUDGMENT 7 an elected representative and in conformity with the obligations attaching thereto. 12. By decision (Auto) of 19 May 1982, the Supreme Court refused to admit the majority of the evidence put forward by the defence, on the ground that it was intended to show the truth of the information disseminated. There were divergences in academic opinion and even in its own caselaw as to whether the defence of truth (exceptio veritatis) could be pleaded in respect of insults directed at the State institutions, but the reforms of the Criminal Code then under way clarified the question: those institutions fell outside the scope of that defence and Article 461 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 21 below) authorised it only where civil servants were involved. The evidence which the defence proposed to adduce was not therefore admissible in the proceedings pending, without prejudice to the possibility available to the accused of instituting criminal proceedings as he considered fit. Mr Castells filed an appeal (recurso de súplica), but on 16 June 1982 the Supreme Court confirmed its decision on the ground that the accuracy of the information was not decisive for a charge of insulting the Government. The applicant then filed an appeal (amparo) in the Constitutional Court, alleging that the rights of the defence had been disregarded. That court dismissed it on 10 November 1982, holding that the question could be resolved only in the light of the proceedings in their entirety and after the decision of the trial court. (b) The trial 13. The Criminal Division of the Supreme Court held a hearing on 27 October 1983 and gave judgment on 31 October. It sentenced the applicant to a term of imprisonment of one year and a day for proffering insults of a less serious kind (menos graves) against the Government; as an accessory penalty he was also disqualified for the same period from holding any public office and exercising a profession and ordered to pay costs. It found in the first place, with regard to the objective element of the offence, that the expressions used in the article were sufficiently strong to damage the reputation of the injured parties and to reveal an attitude of contempt. As far as the subjective element was concerned, it considered that, as a senator, Mr Castells had available to him very obvious means of expression, provided for in the Assembly's rules of procedure, through which to carry out his duties of monitoring and criticising the Government's activities; as he had failed to use these means, he could not claim to have acted on behalf of his electorate. The defence's second argument, based on the aim of political criticism (animus criticandi), did not remove its defamatory purpose (animus injuriandi), but reduced the importance thereof. In the case under examination, the insults proffered with the aim of political