92 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session ally unaffected by the breach.454 “Material” damage here refers to damage to property or other interests of the State and its nationals which is assessable in financial terms. “Moral” damage includes such items as individual pain and suffering, loss of loved ones or personal affront associated with an intrusion on one’s home or private life. Questions of reparation for such forms of damage are dealt with in more detail in chapter II of this Part.455 (6) The question whether damage to a protected interest is a necessary element of an internationally wrongful act has already been discussed.456 There is in general no such requirement; rather this is a matter which is determined by the relevant primary rule. In some cases, the gist of a wrong is the causing of actual harm to another State. In some cases what matters is the failure to take necessary precautions to prevent harm even if in the event no harm occurs. In some cases there is an outright commitment to perform a specified act, e.g. to incorporate uniform rules into internal law. In each case the primary obligation will determine what is required. Hence, article 12 defines a breach of an international obligation as a failure to conform with an obligation. (7) As a corollary there is no general requirement, over and above any requirements laid down by the relevant primary obligation, that a State should have suffered material harm or damage before it can seek reparation for a breach. The existence of actual damage will be highly relevant to the form and quantum of reparation. But there is no general requirement of material harm or damage for a State to be entitled to seek some form of reparation. In the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration it was initially argued that “in the theory of international responsibility, damage is necessary to provide a basis for liability to make reparation”, but the parties subsequently agreed that: Unlawful action against non-material interests, such as acts affecting the honor, dignity or prestige of a State, entitle the victim State to receive adequate reparation, even if those acts have not resulted in a pecuniary or material loss for the claimant State.457 The tribunal held that the breach by France had “provoked indignation and public outrage in New Zealand and caused a new, additional non-material damage … of a moral, political and legal nature, resulting from the affront to the dignity and prestige not only of New Zealand as such, but of its highest judicial and executive authorities as well”.458 454 Although not individually injured, such States may be entitled to invoke responsibility in respect of breaches of certain classes of obligation in the general interest, pursuant to article 48. Generally on notions of injury and damage, see B. Bollecker-Stern, Le préjudice dans la théorie de la responsabilité internationale (Paris, Pedone, 1973); B. Graefrath, “Responsibility and damages caused: relationship between responsibility and damages”, Collected Courses ... 1984–II (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1985), vol. 185, p. 95; A. Tanzi, “Is damage a distinct condition for the existence of an internationally wrongful act?”, Spinedi and Simma, eds., op. cit. (footnote 175 above), p. 1; and Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations … (footnote 92 above), pp. 53–88. 455 See especially article 36 and commentary. 456 See paragraph (9) of the commentary to article 2. 457 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 266–267, paras. 107 and 109. 458 Ibid., p. 267, para. 110. (8) Where two States have agreed to engage in particular conduct, the failure by one State to perform the obligation necessarily concerns the other. A promise has been broken and the right of the other State to performance correspondingly infringed. For the secondary rules of State responsibility to intervene at this stage and to prescribe that there is no responsibility because no identifiable harm or damage has occurred would be unwarranted. If the parties had wished to commit themselves to that formulation of the obligation they could have done so. In many cases, the damage that may follow from a breach (e.g. harm to a fishery from fishing in the closed season, harm to the environment by emissions exceeding the prescribed limit, abstraction from a river of more than the permitted amount) may be distant, contingent or uncertain. Nonetheless, States may enter into immediate and unconditional commitments in their mutual long-term interest in such fields. Accordingly, article 31 defines “injury” in a broad and inclusive way, leaving it to the primary obligations to specify what is required in each case. (9) Paragraph 2 addresses a further issue, namely the question of a causal link between the internationally wrongful act and the injury. It is only “[i]njury … caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State” for which full reparation must be made. This phrase is used to make clear that the subject matter of reparation is, globally, the injury resulting from and ascribable to the wrongful act, rather than any and all consequences flowing from an internationally wrongful act. (10) The allocation of injury or loss to a wrongful act is, in principle, a legal and not only a historical or causal process. Various terms are used to describe the link which must exist between the wrongful act and the injury in order for the obligation of reparation to arise. For example, reference may be made to losses “attributable to [the wrongful] act as a proximate cause”,459 or to damage which is “too indirect, remote, and uncertain to be appraised”,460 or to “any direct loss, damage including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of ” the wrongful act.461 Thus, causality in fact is a necessary 459 See United States-German Mixed Claims Commission, Administrative Decision No. II, UNRIAA, vol. VII (Sales No. 1956.V.5), p. 23, at p. 30 (1923). See also Dix (footnote 178 above), p. 121, and the Canadian statement of claim following the disintegration of the Cosmos 954 Soviet nuclear-powered satellite over its territory in 1978, ILM, vol. 18 (1979), p. 907, para. 23. 460 See the Trail Smelter arbitration (footnote 253 above), p. 1931. See also A. Hauriou, “Les dommages indirects dans les arbitrages internationaux”, RGDIP, vol. 31 (1924), p. 209, citing the “Alabama” arbitration as the most striking application of the rule excluding “indirect” damage (footnote 87 above). 461 Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, para. 16. This was a resolution adopted with reference to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, but it is expressed to reflect Iraq’s liability “under international law … as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait”. UNCC and its Governing Council have provided some guidance on the interpretation of the requirements of directness and causation under paragraph 16. See, e.g., Recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners concerning individual claims for serious personal injury or death (category “B” claims), report of 14 April 1994 (S/AC.26/1994/1), approved by the Governing Council in its decision 20 of 26 May 1994 (S/AC.26/Dec.20 (1994)); Report and recommendations made by the panel of Commissioners appointed to review the Well Blowout Control Claim (the “WBC claim”), of 15 November 1996 (S/AC.26/1996/5/Annex), paras. 66–86, approved by the Governing