State responsibility assessable damage including loss of profits so far as this is established in the given case. The qualification “financially assessable” is intended to exclude compensation for what is sometimes referred to as “moral damage” to a State, i.e. the affront or injury caused by a violation of rights not associated with actual damage to property or persons: this is the subject matter of satisfaction, dealt with in article 37. (2) Of the various forms of reparation, compensation is perhaps the most commonly sought in international practice. In the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, ICJ declared: “It is a well-established rule of international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it.”511 It is equally well established that an international court or tribunal which has jurisdiction with respect to a claim of State responsibility has, as an aspect of that jurisdiction, the power to award compensation for damage suffered.512 (3) The relationship with restitution is clarified by the final phrase of article 36, paragraph 1 (“insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution”). Restitution, despite its primacy as a matter of legal principle, is frequently unavailable or inadequate. It may be partially or entirely ruled out either on the basis of the exceptions expressed in article 35, or because the injured State prefers compensation or for other reasons. Even where restitution is made, it may be insufficient to ensure full reparation. The role of compensation is to fill in any gaps so as to ensure full reparation for damage suffered.513 As the Umpire said in the “Lusitania” case: The fundamental concept of “damages” is ... reparation for a loss suffered; a judicially ascertained compensation for wrong. The remedy should be commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be made whole.514 Likewise, the role of compensation was articulated by PCIJ in the following terms: Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it—such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.515 511 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (see footnote 27 above), p. 81, para. 152. See also the statement by PCIJ in Factory at Chorzów, Merits (footnote 34 above), declaring that “[i]t is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may consist in an indemnity” (p. 27). 512 Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction (see footnote 34 above); Fisheries Jurisdiction (see footnote 432 above), pp. 203–205, paras. 71–76; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (see footnote 36 above), p. 142. 513 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), pp. 47–48. 514 UNRIAA, vol. VII (Sales No. 1956.V.5), p. 32, at p. 39 (1923). 515 Factory at Chorzów, Merits (see footnote 34 above), p. 47, cited and applied, inter alia, by ITLOS in the case of the M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 1999 , p. 65, para. 170 (1999). See also Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (article 50), Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 330–B, para. 36 (1995); Velásquez Rodríguez (footnote 63 above), pp. 26–27 and 30–31; and Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMSAFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Iran-U.S. C.T.R., vol. 6, p. 219, at p. 225 (1984). 99 Entitlement to compensation for such losses is supported by extensive case law, State practice and the writings of jurists. (4) As compared with satisfaction, the function of compensation is to address the actual losses incurred as a result of the internationally wrongful act. In other words, the function of article 36 is purely compensatory, as its title indicates. Compensation corresponds to the financially assessable damage suffered by the injured State or its nationals. It is not concerned to punish the responsible State, nor does compensation have an expressive or exemplary character.516 Thus, compensation generally consists of a monetary payment, though it may sometimes take the form, as agreed, of other forms of value. It is true that monetary payments may be called for by way of satisfaction under article 37, but they perform a function distinct from that of compensation. Monetary compensation is intended to offset, as far as may be, the damage suffered by the injured State as a result of the breach. Satisfaction is concerned with non-material injury, specifically non-material injury to the State, on which a monetary value can be put only in a highly approximate and notional way.517 (5) Consistently with other provisions of Part Two, article 36 is expressed as an obligation of the responsible State to provide reparation for the consequences flowing from the commission of an internationally wrongful act.518 The scope of this obligation is delimited by the phrase “any financially assessable damage”, that is, any damage which is capable of being evaluated in financial terms. Financially assessable damage encompasses both damage suffered by the State itself (to its property or personnel or in respect of expenditures reasonably incurred to remedy or mitigate damage flowing from an internationally wrongful act) as well as damage suffered by nationals, whether persons or companies, on whose behalf the State is claiming within the framework of diplomatic protection. (6) In addition to ICJ, international tribunals dealing with issues of compensation include the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,519 the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,520 human rights courts and other 516 In the Velásquez Rodriguez, Compensatory Damages case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that international law did not recognize the concept of punitive or exemplary damages (Series C, No. 7 (1989)). See also Letelier and Moffitt, ILR, vol. 88, p. 727 (1992), concerning the assassination in Washington, D.C., by Chilean agents of a former Chilean minister; the compromis excluded any award of punitive damages, despite their availability under United States law. On punitive damages, see also N. Jørgensen, “A reappraisal of punitive damages in international law”, BYBIL, 1997, vol. 68, pp. 247–266; and S. Wittich, “Awe of the gods and fear of the priests: punitive damages in the law of State responsibility”, Austrian Review of International and European Law, vol. 3, No. 1 (1998), p. 101. 517 See paragraph (3) of the commentary to article 37. 518 For the requirement of a sufficient causal link between the internationally wrongful act and the damage, see paragraphs (11) to (13) of the commentary to article 31. 519 For example, the M/V “Saiga” case (see footnote 515 above), paras. 170–177. 520 The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has developed a substantial jurisprudence on questions of assessment of damage and the valuation of expropriated property. For reviews of the tribunal’s juris- (Continued on next page.)