State responsibility forbidden any firing on aircraft which flew over Yugoslav territory without authorization, presuming that, for its part, the United States Government “would undertake the steps necessary to prevent these flights, except in the case of emergency or bad weather, for which arrangements could be made by agreement between American and Yugoslav authorities”.362 The reply of the United States Acting Secretary of State reiterated the assertion that no United States planes had flown over Yugoslavia intentionally without prior authorization from Yugoslav authorities “unless forced to do so in an emergency”. However, the Acting Secretary of State added: I presume that the Government of Yugoslavia recognizes that in case a plane and its occupants are jeopardized, the aircraft may change its course so as to seek safety, even though such action may result in flying over Yugoslav territory without prior clearance.363 (3) Claims of distress have also been made in cases of violation of maritime boundaries. For example, in December 1975, after British naval vessels entered Icelandic territorial waters, the British Government claimed that the vessels in question had done so in search of “shelter from severe weather, as they have the right to do under customary international law”.364 Iceland maintained that British vessels were in its waters for the sole purpose of provoking an incident, but did not contest the point that if the British vessels had been in a situation of distress, they could enter Icelandic territorial waters. (4) Although historically practice has focused on cases involving ships and aircraft, article 24 is not limited to such cases.365 The “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration involved a plea of distress as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness outside the context of ships or aircraft. France sought to justify its conduct in removing the two officers from the island of Hao on the ground of “circumstances of distress in a case of extreme urgency involving elementary humanitarian considerations affecting the acting organs of the State”.366 The tribunal unanimously accepted that this plea was admissible in principle, and by majority that it was applicable to the facts of one of the two cases. As to the principle, the tribunal required France to show three things: (1) The existence of very exceptional circumstances of extreme urgency involving medical or other considerations of an elementary nature, provided always that a prompt recognition of the existence of those exceptional circumstances is subsequently obtained from the other interested party or is clearly demonstrated. 362 United States of America, Department of State Bulletin (see footnote 351 above), reproduced in the study prepared by the Secretariat (see footnote 345 above), para. 144. 363 Study prepared by the Secretariat (see footnote 345 above), para. 145. The same argument is found in the Memorial of 2 December 1958 submitted by the United States Government to ICJ in relation to another aerial incident (I.C.J. Pleadings, Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, pp. 358–359). 364 Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, 1866th meeting, 16 December 1975, para. 24; see the study prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above), para. 136. 365 There have also been cases involving the violation of a land frontier in order to save the life of a person in danger. See, e.g., the case of violation of the Austrian border by Italian soldiers in 1862, study prepared by the Secretariat (footnote 345 above), para. 121. 366 “Rainbow Warrior” (see footnote 46 above), pp. 254–255, para. 78. 79 (2) The reestablishment of the original situation of compliance with the assignment in Hao as soon as the reasons of emergency invoked to justify the repatriation had disappeared. (3) The existence of a good faith effort to try to obtain the consent of New Zealand in terms of the 1986 Agreement.367 In fact, the danger to one of the officers, though perhaps not life-threatening, was real and might have been imminent, and it was not denied by the New Zealand physician who subsequently examined him. By contrast, in the case of the second officer, the justifications given (the need for medical examination on grounds of pregnancy and the desire to see a dying father) did not justify emergency action. The lives of the agent and the child were at no stage threatened and there were excellent medical facilities nearby. The tribunal held that: [C]learly these circumstances entirely fail to justify France’s responsibility for the removal of Captain Prieur and from the breach of its obligations resulting from the failure to return the two officers to Hao (in the case of Major Mafart once the reasons for their removal had disappeared). There was here a clear breach of its obligations.368 (5) The plea of distress is also accepted in many treaties as a circumstance justifying conduct which would otherwise be wrongful. Article 14, paragraph 3, of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone permits stopping and anchoring by ships during their passage through foreign territorial seas insofar as this conduct is rendered necessary by distress. This provision is repeated in much the same terms in article 18, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.369 Similar provisions appear in the international conventions on the prevention of pollution at sea.370 (6) Article 24 is limited to cases where human life is at stake. The tribunal in the “Rainbow Warrior” arbitration appeared to take a broader view of the circumstances justifying a plea of distress, apparently accepting that a serious health risk would suffice. The problem with extending article 24 to less than life-threatening situations is where to place any lower limit. In situations of distress involving aircraft there will usually be no difficulty in establishing that there is a threat to life, but other cases present a wide range of possibilities. Given the context of chapter V and the likelihood that there will be other solutions available for cases which are not apparently life-threatening, it does 367 Ibid., p. 255, para. 79. Ibid., p. 263, para. 99. 369 See also articles 39, paragraph 1 (c), 98 and 109, of the Convention. 370 See, e.g., the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, article IV, paragraph 1 (a) of which provides that the prohibition on the discharge of oil into the sea does not apply if the discharge takes place “for the purpose of securing the safety of the ship, preventing damage to the ship or cargo, or saving life at sea”. See also the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, article V, paragraph 1 of which provides that the prohibition on dumping of wastes does not apply when it is “necessary to secure the safety of human life or of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea … in any case which constitutes a danger to human life or a real threat to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, if dumping appears to be the only way of averting the threat”. See also the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (art. 8, para. 1); and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL Convention), annex I, regulation 11 (a). 368