A/HRC/22/44 before the person is brought before a judge.36 At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights has explained that the “scope for flexibility in interpreting and applying the notion of ‘promptness’ is very limited”.37 The court has also highlighted that “justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities”.38 67. Any extension of the period of deprivation of liberty detention must be based on adequate reasons setting out a detailed justification, which must not be abstract or general in character. 68. The increased reliance on administrative detention is particularly worrying. Types of administrative detention considered by the Working Group include preventive detention, detention in emergency or exceptional situations, detention on counter-terrorism grounds, immigration detention, and administrative penal law detention. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the central provisions regarding the freedom of those detained under an administrative order.39 Administrative detention may also be subject to the customary norm codified in article 14 of the Covenant, e.g. in cases where sanctions, because of their purpose, character or severity, must be regarded as penal even if, under domestic law, the detention is qualified as administrative. 69. Since its establishment, the Working Group has been seized of an overwhelming number of administrative detention cases. Already in 1992, the Working Group held that the detention of the individual under emergency laws was arbitrary and contrary to the provision on the right to seek a remedy and a fair trial. In subsequent years, the Working Group has consistently found violations of the various provisions contained in articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in cases of administrative detention. 70. In the majority of the cases of administrative detention with which the Working Group has dealt, the underlying national legislation does not provide for criminal charges or trial. Consequently, the administrative rather than judicial basis for this type of deprivation of liberty poses particular risks that such detention will be unjust, unreasonable, unnecessary or disproportionate with no possibility of judicial review. 71. Although it is acknowledged that counter-terrorism measures might require “the adoption of specific measures limiting certain guarantees, including those relating to detention and the right to a fair trial” in a very limited manner, the Working Group has repeatedly stressed that “in all circumstances deprivation of liberty must remain consistent with the norms of international law.”40 In this respect, the right of anyone deprived of his or her liberty to bring proceedings before a court in order to challenge the legality of the 36 37 38 39 40 GE.12-18935 Human Rights Committee, Bousroual v. Algeria, communication No. 992/2001, Views adopted on 30 March 2006, para. 9.6; Bandajevsky v. Belarus, communication No. 1100/2002, Views adopted on 28 March 2006, para. 10.3; Borisenko v. Hungary, communication No. 852/1999, Views adopted on 14 October 2002, para. 7.4. See Brogan and Others v. The United Kingdom (application 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85), Judgement, para. 62. European Court of Human Rights, Belchev v. Bulgaria, Final Judgement (application No. 39270/98), Judgement, para. 82. See also Medvedyev and Others v. France (application No. 3394/03), Judgement, paras. 119, 121 and 122. The International Court of Justice in its Diallo decision concluded that article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Covenant apply in principle to any form of arrest or detention and are not confined to criminal proceedings. See Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), para. 77. Report of the Working Group, E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 84. 23