relied on) communicated the information about the date for the hearing of her appeal. By dismissing her appeal, the High Court improperly punished her while the proper person to be punished for ânegligence or recklessnessâ if any, was her counsel. 31. In requesting that the African Commission dismiss the complaint in its entirety, the Respondent State submitted, on 21st August 2003, its response to the same. In its response, the Respondent State disputed the allegation that it violated Article 7 of the African Charter in that the Complainant was indeed granted an opportunity to be heard but chose not to exercise it by failing to appear on the hearing date. The Respondent State annexed a copy of the proceedings of the High Court in question and further argued that although the judiciary is an institution of the Respondent State, the latter could not be at fault for the courtâs dismissing the appeal as the Complainantâs advocate was present on the first date for the hearing and was aware of the date when the hearing was adjourned to, and that despite this knowledge, both the Complainant and her counsel failed to appear on the scheduled date. 32. The Respondent State further argued that there was no violation of Article 14 of the African Charter as the decision to dismiss by the High Court in question was in accordance with Order IX Rule 8 × Where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear where defendant when the suit is called on for hearing, the court shall make an order only appears that the suit be dismissed unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case the court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission, and where part only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the remainder. of the countryâs Civil Procedure Code of 1966. The Complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove her right to property, which right was recognised by the Government. It argued that the matter had been completely dealt with by the Respondent Stateâs Courts of Law and hence the complaint before the Commission was an abuse of process of law. The Respondent State concluded that the appeal was dismissed by the High Court because of the gross misconduct of the Complainantâs advocate and hence she should proceed against her counsel for professional misconduct. 33. By a rejoinder of 23rd October 2003, the Complainant maintained that there was no evidence whatsoever to show that she was duly served or notified of the date set for the hearing by the High Court that dismissed the appeal, and hence the dismissal was contrary to the cardinal principle of natural justice, the right to be heard. She insisted that she did not have knowledge of the hearing date as the records show that she was absent when the matter was adjourned. 34. She further averred that her main prayers as laid before the magistrateâs court, dissolution of marriage and division of matrimonial property, remained undecided to date as the High Courtâs dismissal order erroneously based itself on the Law of Limitations Act of 1971. She claimed that even if she were absent on the date the matter was called for hearing, which fact she denied, the High Court was wrong to dismiss her appeal as it was not mandatory under the law (Order XXXIX Rule 11 (1) × The Court, after sending for the record if it thinks fit so to do, and after fixing a day for hearing the appellant or his advocate and hearing him accordingly if he appears on that day, may dismiss the appeal without sending notice to the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred and without serving notice on the respondent or his advocate. of the Civil Procedure Code of 1966) that non-appearance of the appellant shall result in dismissal of the appeal. 35. The Complainant followed this by a further submission dated 13th January 2004 addressing the contents of the copy of the proceedings before the High Court that dismissed her appeal for non-appearance. In that, she alleged that the matter concerned matrimonial issue, which required determination for purposes of giving rights to each party, exacting special care due to its nature relating to divorce, custody of children, and division of property. The Counsel for the appellant that appeared before the High Court was a human being and anything might have happened to her and as such her non-appearance on the hearing date ought to have been given excuse. Besides, the Complainant further alleged, the non-appearance was a first default and the trial judge should have adjourned the matter and order for the parties to be notified to appear on another date. She maintained that the dismissals failed to consider the interest of both parties as far as married life was concerned, which, together with the rights of each party, had to be determined. 36. A look at both partiesâ submissions and documentary evidence adduced before the African Commission showed that an important fact, that neither the Complainant nor her counsel appeared before the High Court on the date her appeal was slated to be heard, was correct. As summarised above, however, the Complainant held that the dismissal that ensued was not justified as she had not been notified 3