× Article 14 (3) (e) (e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; of ICCPR explains that the trial should also guarantee the right of the accused "to examine or have examined the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him." Where the trial is held in camera, there can be no independent demonstration that these requirements have been met. 39. The State Party has not shown that the holding of the proceedings in secret was within the parameters of the exceptional circumstances contemplated above. The Commission therefore finds this a violation of the victims' right to fair hearing guaranteed under Article 7 of the Charter. 40. Article 7(1) (b) stipulates that: Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent court or tribunal. The presumption of innocence is universally recognised. With it is also the right to silence. This means that no accused should be required to testify against himself or to incriminate himself or be required to make a confession under duress (Article 6 (2) × Article (6) (2) (2) In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court. ( http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#part3 Accessed 21-10-10) and 14(3) (g) × Article 14 (3) (g) (g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. ( http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm#art14 Accessed 21-10-10) of ICCPR). 41. In Krause v Switzerland, the European Commission noted that this principle constituted a fundamental principle, which protects everybody against being treated by public officials as if they were guilty of an offence even before a competent court establishes such guilt. It has been alleged that videotapes show the accused making confession before other military officials. It is suggested that the officials affirmed the guilt of the accused on the basis of the "confessions". No evidence was led showing that these were the same officials who presided or participated in the military tribunal that tried them. The alleged tapes were not presented to the Commission as evidence. In the circumstances, the Commission cannot make a finding on hearsay evidence. We cannot therefore find that the right to presumption of innocence has been violated. 42. The communication alleges that the trial, conviction and sentence of civilians (as at the time of filing of the complaint, one civilian was convicted and sentenced to death) by the tribunal, composed of military personnel as judges, was a breach of Article 7 of the Charter. The Commission is not convinced that in the circumstances of this case, it was possible to have a separation of trials nor has it been alleged that the civilian accused applied for such separation. It may well be that the cause of justice would not have been served by such a separation. In the circumstances and in this respect, we are not in a position to find a violation Article 7 (1) (d) of the Charter. 43. The communication alleges that the composition of the tribunal, which was presided over by a serving military officer, did not meet the requirement of an independent and impartial judicial panel to try the accused. It is therefore a violation of Article 7(1) (d) of the Charter, which provides: Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (d) The right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal. 44. It has been stated elsewhere in this decision, that a military tribunal per se is not offensive to the rights in the Charter nor does it imply an unfair or unjust process. We make the point that military tribunals must be subject to the same requirements of fairness, openness and justice, independence and due process as any other tribunal or court. What causes offence is failure to observe basic or fundamental standards that would ensure fairness. As that matter has been dealt with above, it is not necessary to find that a tribunal 5